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INTRODUCTION 
 
The definition of social mobility is the object of some discussion, and although there is a 
common thread that runs through all of these discussions, the actual definition varies 
from study to study. There is agreement that social mobility refers to “movements by 
specific entities between periods in socioeconomic status indicators” (Behrman, 2000) 
and that it aims to quantify “the movement of given [entities] through the distribution of 
economic well-being over time, establishing how dependent one’s current economic 
position is on one’s past position, and relating people’s mobility experiences” to the 
overall conditions of the economy in which they operate (Fields, 2000). Differences arise, 
however, when an attempt is made to endow these definitions with empirical content  
(i.e., when an effort is made to determine what variable should be used to measure 
mobility, what exactly should be considered “movement” in a distribution, or what time 
spans should be used to evaluate mobility). In the following discussion, we briefly 
comment on some of the conceptual issues that have been raised in the literature on 
mobility.  
 
Among the multiple considerations concerning the definition of mobility, in this paper we 
define social mobility as a situation in which the relative economic status of an agent is 
not dependent on starting conditions such as parental income or family background. 
Therefore, analyzing the determinants of mobility involves exploring the channels 
through which offspring’s income is correlated to its parents’, such as inherited bequest, 
education, formal rules, skills, opportunities, working spirit, among many others.   
 
As parental linkage is a source of differences in income among individuals, there is a 
deep relation between social mobility and inequality. They are jointly determined, and the 
most prevalent theoretical association between mobility and inequality is negative; since 
structural conditions that lead to low mobility also tend to favor unequal outcomes. 
 
Assessing inequality, leads as to investigate analytical frameworks to analyze the sources 
of differences in incomes: from effort, education and ability to the beliefs about the 
nature of the income generating process.  As long as these determinants are at least 
partially related to the parental background, we will find a strong link between social 
mobility and: equal opportunities, meritocracy, human capital accumulation, politico-
economic considerations and beliefs, which we will account for in this survey.  
 
Furthermore, when initial conditions prevent individuals from allocating resources 
optimally, if social mobility is limited, economic efficiency is reduced. For example, this 
happens whenever liquidity constraints prevent individuals from acquiring an efficient 
level of human capita. Therefore, it is of great relevance to understand that social 
mobility and efficiency are also determined together.  
 
 
 
 
 2 
Finally, throughout this survey, we map the key parameters affecting mobility into 
proposed policy actions, from each model studied. We find that policies that break the 
dependence of outcomes on initial conditions, such us universal public education or early 
intervention programs may be successful in raising income and social mobility. 
Furthermore, due to the relationship between mobility and other social and economic 
dimension such as efficiency and inequality; those policies can have broader short and 
long term effects. 
 
This survey is divided into 8 sections. In the first one, some preliminary concepts related 
to the definition of mobility are briefly explained. Section 2 comprises the review of a 
range of models of income mobility that relates it to human capital, credit constraints, 
education and technology, among others. The third section deals with the politico-
economic considerations regarding inequality and mobility.  In Section 4, it is established 
the relationship between social mobility and both equal opportunity and meritocracy. The 
next section introduces a key concept: efficiency, in the context of the models that assess 
social mobility. In section 6, there is a discussion about the effects of social mobility 
from an economic efficiency and also from political outcomes points of view. Section 7 
includes models that consider the perception of mobility. To conclude, in section 8, there 
is a summary of the policy implications of the surveyed models, showing the different 
policies that have the potential to improve social mobility in the short and long terms.  
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1. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS 
 
Socioeconomic Status Indicators 
 
When studying mobility, we are interested in using an indicator that can capture some 
element of economic well-being. This entails taking variables into consideration which 
measure long-term status rather than short-term fluctuations. (We do not, after all, want 
to confuse social mobility with economic insecurity.) When trying to encapsulate this 
general idea of concrete, operational content, we may want to consider consumption 
(which is, presumably, closely linked to permanent income), educational attainment, 
asset holdings (wealth), or some composite measure of socioeconomic level. 
  
Data availability considerations, unfortunately, quickly limit the scope of the indicators 
used in actual studies, as mobility research calls for long panels, or, at the least, 
information on parents and offspring. It is already quite hard to find high-quality datasets 
that provide this kind of information on income and labor earnings, which are some of the 
most commonly measured socioeconomic indicators. Reliable long-term information on 
consumption, or socioeconomic status, is practically nonexistent, especially in developing 
countries. Data on intergenerational educational attainment, on the other hand, is easier to 
find, partly because retrospective questions (questions on parental educational attainment, 
for instance) are bound to be reliably answered. As a result, most of the studies now 
available focus on income and educational attainment.  
 
Time Period 
 
There are two main types of mobility that we may want to study, depending on the length 
of time we allow for changes to take place. Intragenerational mobility refers to 
movements in the indicator of choice that occur in a relatively short time span – typically 
within an individual’s adulthood. Intergenerational mobility, on the other hand, refers to 
changes that are observed from one generation to the next. Thus, intragenerational 
mobility studies follow individuals throughout their lives, while intergenerational studies 
focus on entire dynasties, tracking their movements from one generation to the next. 
 
Movements 
 
The main source of controversy regarding social mobility is arguably the issue of how to 
define “movement” within a distribution. Different concerns give rise to very different 
ideas about how to quantify changes in an individual’s economic status. A very 
preliminary observation is that no meaningful “movement” can ever occur unless there is 
variability in the values of the indicator to be studied. In other words, income mobility 
would be an empty concept if income inequality did not matter. 
 
Fields (2000) provides a useful categorization of different mobility concepts, as well as 
stating some of the implicit assumptions and value judgments underlying each one. He 
shows that the kind of normative (or subjective) choice that is made in studies of social 
mobility goes beyond simply deciding whether it is a “good” or “bad” feature. Following 
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Fields (2000), imagine the following societies numbered from 1 to 5, formed by 3 
individuals (these are somewhat extreme examples, but serve to point out the sources of 
disagreement): 
 
Table 1: Hypothetical Changes in Income Distributions 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Andrea 20 5 20 40 5 
Brian 10 10 30 20 1 
Chris 30 10 20 60 15 
 
Any relative measure of mobility would indicate that, in going from society 1 to society 
2, there has been perfect mobility. The correlation between the two, indeed, is zero. But 
note that average wealth has gone down and, as a result, so have income levels for all but 
one of the individuals. The transition from society 2 to society 3, where the correlation is 
0.5 – mobility is much lower – but all incomes have gone up, is the mirror image of the 
first. In this sense, it could be argued that the movement from 2 to 3 is more desirable 
than from 1 to 2.  
 
The main point here is that relative measures of mobility do not take changes in the 
average income level into account. While this is seen as a flaw by researchers who would 
say that an environment where all incomes are growing is “mobile” or “dynamic”, even if 
social ranks are not moving, we believe that mobility concerns arise mainly because of 
relative considerations. In other words, societies tend to favor situations where 
individuals’ relative status is considerably independent from their parents’ degree of 
success, and this is best captured by measures of relative mobility.  
 
One distinction should be noted with regard to measures of relative mobility. Positional 
movement takes place when an individual changes her position in the overall distribution. 
Related to this is share movement, which focuses on the change in an individual’s share 
of the overall total.
2
 Both are instances of what Behrman (2000) calls “relative” or 
“exchange” mobility.  
 
A process whereby all members double their incomes would be perfectly immobile under 
both measures (this would correspond to going from society 1 to society 4). Also, a 
process in which total income decreases and inequality increases while ranks remain the 
same would show no positional mobility, but shares would have changed (this is the case 
in going from distribution 4 to 5). Rankings can also change drastically with very little 
change in income, as is the case in the shift from society 2 to society 5.
3
 
                                               
2 Although we are trying to avoid referring to “income” in order to drive home the point that we are 
interested in a broader notion of “social” mobility, it is clear that there must be some quantitative element 
in order to talk meaningfully about “shares”. 
3 This kind of objection is valid to some extent, and we mention it because some of the researchers in this 
area actually do raise such objections. But the fact is that this kind of example does not seem to be in line 
with what we see – or would expect to see – in real life settings. And relative movements do have the 
advantage that they capture the persistence of inequality in a way that absolute measures do not  precisely 
because they abstract away from changes in mean income, or even in its distribution. The main point to be 
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The aim is to isolate the distributional component from mobility. We believe that 
mobility concerns are entirely related to ranks; thus, there may be social mobility even if 
the overall distribution becomes more unequal. In any case, the lesson to be learned from 
these examples is that a complete picture of the desirability of an income process cannot 
be derived from any one summary measure because changes in average income levels, 
changes in the overall distribution, and the degree to which relative performance in one 
generation depends on relative performance in the past must all be taken into account.   
 
Absolute movement measures, in contrast, focus on quantifying the total change, 
regardless of whether any exchange mobility has taken place. We will not go into 
detailed definitions of these instruments here, however, since they do not seem to be 
relevant to the type of concern that drives this study. 
 
Although we may be content with quantifying movement – whatever definition we decide 
upon – it is usually the case that we also want to capture other aspects of movement. In 
particular, studies of social mobility are generally concerned with gauging how 
dependent final outcomes are on initial conditions. In other words, income mobility may 
exist because individual incomes follow an identical random process, independent of 
initial income, or there may be some sort of dependence – usually captured by a 
correlation coefficient – between income realizations for the same individual (or dynasty) 
across time. Most studies of mobility equate time dependence with immobility and, 
generally speaking, this is the approach that is favored in this paper. 
 
We believe that the concept of mobility is quite distinct from that of economic growth 
and is closely connected to notions of efficiency, fairness, and political conflict which 
follow paths that are largely unconnected to overall growth. This is why we choose to 
focus on measures of relative, rather than absolute, mobility. As will be made clear in this 
paper, the time span to be chosen will depend on the context of the analysis, while the 
issue of time dependence will invariably play an important role: increasing social 
mobility implies breaking the dependence of individual economic outcomes on initial 
conditions. 
 
Normative Analysis of the Correlation Coefficient 
 
A low correlation coefficient indicates that mobility is high and that parental income is 
weakly correlated with individual income, whereas a high correlation coefficient signals 
low mobility. However, authors such as Swift (2005) and Feldman et al. (2000) claim 
that a zero correlation is not a morally desirable goal because any serious attempt to 
disconnect the life-income of parents and their offspring would severely compromise 
important values of family life and privacy.  Thus, they argue, instead of pursuing the 
objective of zero intergenerational correlation, we should ask ourselves which 
mechanisms of intergenerational transmission are unfair and should then design our 
                                                                                                                                            
made here is that, just as reporting on inequality does not seem complete without studying mobility, 
measuring mobility will not give us a perfect picture of how “desirable” a given society is. Although this is 
undeniably the case, it is also true of any other one-dimensional measure. 
 6 
policies accordingly. Following the same line of reasoning, Jencks and Tach (2005) claim 
that if we want to know whether opportunity is becoming more or less equal, we need to 
track intergenerational linkages that violate certain norms associated with meritocracies 
and developmental opportunity. Under their definition of developmental opportunity, 
society must either make families and communities more alike or find ways to offset the 
adverse effect of growing up in a disadvantaged family or community.  
 
Implicit in the reasoning of these authors is the idea that some sources of advantages are 
acceptable or even desirable while others not. For instance, many people agree that 
ethnicity should not be a source of advantage, but that effort should. Family contacts, 
intelligence, or other genetic or environmental traits are more debatable. Therefore, if 
acceptable sources of advantages are somehow inherited by children of advantaged 
parents, we would observe a positive correlation between parental and individual incomes 
even if no unacceptable source of advantages remained. 
 
However, even if all sources of unacceptable advantages were eliminated and the 
correlation between parental and individual income were fully explained by acceptable 
advantages, we could still argue that policy interventions to help the disadvantaged would 
reduce the correlation. Normative evaluation of such policies would ultimately depend on 
the social preferences of the evaluator and his preference for mobility per se.  
 
Relation with Other Distributional Features 
 
Concerns about static aspects of a society’s welfare distribution – such as inequality, 
poverty or polarization – are, as a rule, intimately connected with any discussion on 
social mobility. Most theoretical studies focus on the joint determination of mobility and 
inequality, since concepts such as poverty and polarization are hard to incorporate into a 
model. We will therefore examine the relationships between inequality and mobility. 
 
The most common characterization points to inequality as being “a snapshot” of the 
income-generating process at any point in time, while mobility is seen as tracking income 
distribution over time based on individual trajectories. When considered from this 
standpoint, the absence of mobility accentuates all issues associated with inequality. It 
also underscores the fact that a comparison between the prevailing income distributions 
in two societies – two “snapshots” – may reverse when mobility is incorporated into the 
analysis. 
 
This reversal would only happen if higher mobility were somehow associated with higher 
inequality and vice versa, so that superficially “equal” societies might actually have more 
persistent inequality than highly unequal societies. As we will see, this is far from 
obvious, and theoretical models as well as empirical evidence provide mixed results. In 
fact, the most prevalent theoretical association between mobility and inequality is 
negative, since structural conditions that lead to low mobility also tend to favor unequal 
outcomes. 
 
2. MODELS OF INCOME MOBILITY 
 7 
 
Becker and Tomes (1979) were one of the first to model income mobility and inequality. 
In their economy, there is a continuum of dynasties. Each generation values its own 
consumption as well as its offspring’s income:  
 
 1,  tttt IZUU  (1) 
 
 
where Ut is parents’ utility, Zt stands for parents’ consumption, and It+1 is the adult wealth 
of their children. 
 
This wealth is embodied in a stock of human and nonhuman capital that has three 
sources: a direct investment from each generation’s parents (y); endowed “luck” that is 
correlated across contiguous generations of the same dynasty (e) (which can be 
interpreted as ability, intelligence, social background or values, and family connections); 
and sheer market luck (u).  
 
In other words, we think of individuals in this model as helping their children out in two 
ways. They can decide to leave them “capital” by investing in their education or 
providing them with financial capital. This is a deliberate decision on the part of the 
parents. In addition, they pass on family characteristics that were assigned by “luck” to 
each dynasty.  Parents cannot alter such characteristics or prevent them from being 
transmitted. A natural interpretation would involve genetic characteristics, but there are 
also family connections, “norms” or “customs” within each household, as well as other 
non-biological traits, that are largely the result of each family’s history and that cannot be 
radically changed by any individual dynasty. A poor parent cannot build family 
connections out of thin air.  
 
Of course, there is a final element of “luck” in determining individual income; people 
will typically differ in the extent to which they take full advantage of their endowment, 
and their resourcefulness or drive may lead them to find new opportunities. Serendipity 
may also intervene. This is the way in which the term u should be interpreted. 
 
As can be seen from equation (2), each part of this capital stock has the same (constant) 
market return, w.
4
 Parents are assumed to be risk-neutral and to choose their bequests in 
order to maximize their own expected utility, subject to a budget constraint (where r is 
the intergenerational rate of return), 
 
1 1
1
t t
t t
t
w y
Z I
r
  

 (3) 
 
                                               
4 Thus, both inequality and mobility refer to the distribution of capital stock or of all sources of income. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1t t t t t t tI w y w e w u          (2) 
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and a law of motion for endowed luck that depends on the family endowment and the 
average level of endowed luck in the economy. 
 
 1 11t t t te h f e he v       (4) 
 
In this law of motion, h represents the fraction of family endowment that is inherited, and 
f is the aggregate rate of growth, while v is a random shock. We thus allow for slow 
changes in family “luck”. It may be the case that a rich family loses part of its 
connections, or that someone from a family that does not value “hard work” may still turn 
out to be hardworking and pass this trait on to his children. In any case, as we will see, h 
is a very important parameter of the model, as it measures the extent to which family 
“luck” is equalized across dynasties. When h is close to 0, family endowments are 
basically identical, with some random variation. When it is close to 1, dynasties differ 
permanently. 
 
Families fully anticipate inherited endowment (presumably, any relevant “random” 
shocks to ability, personality, or the like can be observed before making the optimal 
investments), but not random luck. From standard expected utility maximization, and 
normalizing r and w to equal 1, the income of children in the t+1 generation of the ith 
family can be expressed as: 
 
1 1 1
i i i i i
t t t t tI a I he v u            (5) 
 
Using Table 2, equation (5) says that income in a given generation basically depends on 
parental wealth and endowments, although an additional effect is generated through 
endowed and market luck. Crucially, parental preferences determine how strong this 
dependence is.  This model captures the fact that anticipated luck affects how much 
capital parents leave to their offspring, which is why both market and endowment luck 
are not fully appropriated by their children (they only get to enjoy a proportion  ).  
Table 2: Key Variables in Becker and Tomes (1979) 
Variable Interpretation/Definition Depends on 
  
Proportion of parents’ wealth 
that goes to children’s 
income 
- Parents’ utility function – specifically, 
how much children’s income affects 
parental welfare 
- Intergenerational rate of return. 
  
Actual value of the 
propensity to invest in 
children 
 =  1 r  
a  Baseline endowed ability  1e h  
 
All families are assumed to be identical. This means income inequality depends on the 
past history of market luck. Assuming that parameters are such that the persistence of 
initial conditions is limited ( , 1h  ), income in generation t+1 is: 
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  
1 1
1 1 1
0 01 1
k k
i k i i
t t k t k
k k
a h
I u v
h h
 
  
 
  
    
 
 
    
   
   (6) 
 
and the (squared) coefficient of the variation in income – a measure of inequality5 – is:  
 
  
  
2 2 2
1 11
1 1 1
I u e
h
CV CV CV
h
 
  
 
 
  
 (7) 
 
That is, inequality has two components: one that comes from market luck (u), and one 
that comes from endowed advantages (e).
6
 Clearly, if any of these components were less 
variable, income inequality would go down. The additional insight derived from this 
model comes through the effects of   and h . 
 
Note that the coefficient for endowed family luck is larger than the coefficient for market 
luck. The difference between them grows as   and h  become larger. That is, as we 
increase the actual value of the propensity of each generation to invest in the next and the 
degree of family inheritability of characteristics that affect income, we give greater 
weight in overall inequality to family-specific advantages.  
 
However, whereas an increase in h  unambiguously increases inequality, an increase in 
  – say, as the result of a change in preferences or through an increase in market returns 
– reduces the coefficient of variation in income. This is the result of the fact that, while 
it increases the variance in income, it increases the level of income even more. 
 
We next turn to income mobility and then analyze how   and h  affect the trade-off 
between inequality and mobility. The preferred measure of income mobility in this article 
is the effect of an increase in income for generation t on the incomes of subsequent 
generations. This gives us an idea of how quickly “temporary” increases in social 
standing fade away. It measures how long it takes to go “from rags to riches and back”. 
In other words, it captures our preferred concept of mobility as the degree of dependence 
of current outcomes on past performance. Lower persistence is equivalent to higher 
mobility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5 The coefficient of variation of a random variable is defined as the ratio of its standard deviation to its 
mean. That is,   /x xCV x   . In this case, v has zero mean, so that its standard deviation is normalized 
by average endowed luck, or e . 
6 The last term actually reflects exogenous variation in endowed luck, since 
 
2
2
21
v
e
h

 

. 
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Table 3: Effects of One-Time Changes in Income 
Source of Change 
i
t mI   
Behavioral and 
Parametric 
Assumptions 
As m Goes to 
Infinity 
Market or 
endowed luck 
m i
tI   
h  negligible 
1   
Declines 
monotonically 
Endowment 
m i
th I  
No optimization – 
investments are 
given 
Declines 
monotonically 
Endowment  1
im m
tehI h
h e






 
Optimal behavior 
1h    
Rises up to a peak 
in a generation that 
depends on h  , 
then declines 
monotonically 
Optimal behavior 
1h    
Declines 
monotonically 
 
This effect will depend on the source of the increase in income and, as the authors show, 
its magnitude hinges on the interplay between optimizing behavior and inheritability. 
Indeed, if we call tI a change in income for generation t, and we trace changes in the 
mth generation, we can envision the different scenarios described in Table 3. 
 
When the degree of inheritability of endowed luck is close to zero, a look at equation 5 
tells us that each generation will receive a fraction   of any change in the income of the 
previous generation, regardless of the source of this income. This change will decrease as 
the distance between generations increases, given our assumption that 1  . In other 
words, when families do not provide sizeable (dis)advantages to their offspring, mobility 
is high.  
 
If inheritability was high, but investments were not influenced by changes in endowments 
– that is, if families did not optimize – we would see a similar response to a change in 
endowment. However, if we take into account the fact that families do optimize, we can 
see that, for some parameter values, a change in family endowment at time t can 
compound over time before it fades away (implying that a “lucky” generation will make 
its descendants luckier than average for a relatively long time). This is exactly the  result 
that we would associate with a lack of social mobility. 
 
We can now see how income inequality and social mobility may be negatively or 
positively correlated, depending on what is driving their movements. When 
intergenerational inheritability of advantage increases, income inequality goes up and 
social mobility goes down. Thus, differences between families are exacerbated and made 
more persistent.  
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This is intuitive: if family connections or race become more important in determining 
individual income, we would expect differences between families to become more 
pronounced and permanent.  
 
When the propensity to invest in children goes up, mobility again is reduced, because a 
one-time shock to income takes more time to fade away. However, in the long run, 
income differences are reduced, so income inequality goes down.  
 
We can summarize these findings in the following table. 
 
Table 4: Relationship between Inequality and Mobility when Parameter Values 
Change 
Parameter Interpretation 
Effect of an Increase in Parameter  
on Inequality on Mobility 
  Parental propensity 
to invest in children 
Reduces Inequality Reduces Mobility 
h 
Inheritability of 
family advantage 
Increases Inequality Reduces Mobility 
 
Clearly,   is not a parameter that can be manipulated by public policy. It is quite 
impractical and, arguably, even unethical for the state to try to convince parents to care 
less (or more) for their children’s well-being. However, it is not implausible for 
alterations in h to fall within the scope of public policy. Note that a decrease in h is 
equivalent to a homogenization of endowments. That is, a decline in h makes 
endowments more likely to equal the average. Hence, a policy that, for example, calls for 
investments to be made in raising the quality of public education while making it more 
homogeneous
7
 would probably redund in a decrease of h. Note that this reduction would 
also tend to reduce inequality.  
 
Another way of changing h is by promoting meritocratic employment policies, possibly 
through encouragement of market competition among potential employers. Why would 
market competition help attain a meritocracy? Advantages in the labor market that are not 
related to higher productivity – such as race or family connections – can only persist if 
companies that engage in these hiring practices are shielded from their consequences. 
Firms in a competitive environment, in contrast, will come under pressure to adopt 
practices that favor productivity over personal loyalties or racial prejudice.  
 
The main claim underlying these suggestions is that policies that break the dependence 
of outcomes on initial conditions are unambiguously desirable. 
 
Becker and Tomes (1979) abstract from the determination of the return to human capital, 
equating it to physical capital and operating within a stationary economy. Although the 
basic insight – that mobility and inequality are affected by the way in which parents 
optimize when making their decisions, as well as by inheritance of personal qualities – is 
                                               
7 And, potentially, more similar to education in private schools.  
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not in dispute, some unbundling of the process of human capital accumulation as an 
additional force driving inequality and mobility remains to be done. We will comment on 
two lines of work. One focuses on purely economic forces, while the second adds 
politico-economic considerations.  
 
Building on Becker and Tomes: Human Capital and Credit Constraints 
 
Hassler, Rodríguez Mora and Zeira (2003) and Owen and Weil (1998) show how 
inequality and mobility may be jointly determined in a general equilibrium model with 
overlapping generations of workers. In both cases, they draw a distinction between 
skilled and unskilled workers.  They analyze mobility by determining the odds that the 
child of an uneducated worker will become skilled (upward mobility), or the odds that the 
child of a skilled worker will not receive an education (downward mobility).
8
  
 
The key issue in both models is the lack of access to a credit market, since such access 
would allow “high-ability” individuals to invest in their education. This is a very practical 
concern, inasmuch as it has the consequence of making educational decisions (and, 
therefore, income) strongly dependent on parental background. In other words, it is a 
reinterpretation of the parameter h in the Becker and Tomes (1979) model.  
 
Both models assume that ability is not genetically determined. This is why credit 
market failures end up accounting for most of inefficient immobility. The key point to 
bear in mind, though, is that this is a simplifying assumption which serves to highlight 
what aspects other than genetic endowments may affect intergenerational mobility. These 
effects would persist even if ability were, to some degree, genetically inherited. 
 
Owen and Weil: Liquidity Constraints and Multiple Equilibria 
 
Owen and Weil (1998) model the joint determination of aggregate output, income 
distribution, mobility, and returns to education in general equilibrium. Skilled and 
unskilled labors are complements in production, and changes in returns to skill stem from 
changes in the aggregate supply of each kind of labor.
9
 In other words, a large supply of 
unskilled workers increases the skill premium, and vice versa. 
 
Agents differ across two dimensions: they receive different parental transfers, and they 
are born with different ability levels. Ability is independent across generations and is 
defined as the amount of efficiency units supplied to the labor market, regardless of skill 
level (which, instead, affects the wage level at which those units are rewarded). Thus, 
ability is not genetically determined and can be likened to “industriousness” (i.e., how 
hardworking a person is).  
                                               
8 Note that these two probabilities may move in opposite directions: a policy that increases overall 
educational achievement may raise upward mobility and reduce downward mobility. Thus, we once again 
run into the problem of clearly defining what we want to include in the definition of mobility, or must ask 
ourselves whether bundling all these phenomena into one concept even makes sense. 
9 Underlying this result, there is a neoclassical production function and perfect capital mobility, so the 
marginal productivity of capital is constant. 
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The timing is as follows. Individuals can be said to live through two stages. In the first, 
they receive transfers from their parents, then choose an educational level, and work. In 
the second, they consume and leave a bequest to their children. 
 
An individual can acquire skills by buying education at a fixed cost e . If we call 
i
tq  an 
individual’s ability level and s
tw  the wage for skill level s, then we find that there is an 
ability threshold above which it pays to become educated.
10
 In an efficient outcome, 
individuals whose ability level exceeds this threshold will obtain an education. 
 
*
t e u
t t
e
q
w w


 (8) 
 
However, there are no credit markets available to finance educational decisions. This 
means that parental bequests (x) are the only source of funding. Thus, individual 
resources are given by: 
 
*
, , ,
, ,
e i
i t i t t t i t
u
i t i t t
x e q w if x e and q q
x q w otherwise
   

 (9) 
 
In other words, agents will receive an education only if their bequests enable them to 
afford it.  
 
Resources are split between individual consumption and bequests to children, with   
being the weight that is given by parents to bequests.  
 
       1 1 1 1, ln 1 lnt t t tU x c x c        (10) 
 
Clearly, in choosing a given bequest level, parents are determining the expected value of 
their children’s education level. For instance, a bequest lower than e  ensures that 
children will be unskilled workers. 
 
The optimal decisions of each family define, for each distribution of labor supply and 
each level of wages, what the transfers and resulting education levels will be for the next 
generation. The authors look for a steady state of this model – a relative wage level and 
skill distribution such that: 
- Families expect wages to stay the same and therefore choose transfers in such a 
way that the education distribution remains unchanged; and 
- Given the education distribution, this wage level is the outcome of market 
equilibrium. 
 
                                               
10 Equation (8) also shows that, in equilibrium, skilled wages must be higher than unskilled wages. 
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In other words, the starting point for the situation is such that the economy will remain in 
the same state indefinitely. 
 
Owen and Weil find that when individuals face liquidity constraints, there are multiple 
steady-state equilibria which exhibit a positive association between equality and 
mobility. That is, whenever there is high mobility, there is low inequality.  
 
There can, of course, also be a situation in which there is no mobility at all.  In such a 
situation, a handful of skilled workers have high wages that enable them to educate all of 
their children while wages for unskilled workers are so low that education is not 
affordable, even for the most industrious families. In fact, when the cost of education is 
high enough, this is the only kind of steady state there is.
11
 
 
When the cost of education is below a certain ceiling, there is at least one high-income, 
high-mobility equilibrium. In such a situation, the workforce is highly educated, which 
lowers the equilibrium skill wage premium and hence the chances that an unskilled 
worker will find herself limited by her borrowing constraint. This not only reduces 
inequality; it also makes it easier for a high-ability child of an unskilled worker to receive 
an education and lowers the incentive for a low-ability child of a skilled worker to 
acquire skills. In other words, it raises both upward and downward mobility.  
 
In addition, in these equilibria the allocation of education is more sensitive to actual 
ability and less so to parental background than it is in a more unequal economy where 
borrowing constraints are disproportionately greater for the children of low-income 
parents. This is, in fact, why income is higher, as the most industrious workers are in 
high-productivity positions. 
 
In low-income societies, these conclusions are reversed: the stock of skills is small, the 
wage differential is high (so is inequality), and mobility is very low. As a consequence, 
the allocation of resources is more inefficient.
12
  
 
Thus, credit market imperfections make current skill levels dependent on past skill levels, 
as embodied in parental income. The inefficient steady states arise from the fact that this 
dependence is not based on a productivity difference (as would be the case if, for 
instance, ability were inheritable).  
 
The key aspect of this model is that these different steady states coexist as possible 
outcomes for the same economy. In other words, two economies with the same 
parameters (access to the same technology, equal weight given to children in the utility 
function) may end up with widely different mobility and inequality levels. If it were 
possible to change the situation in one period by means of a single (large-scale) policy 
                                               
11 There can also be a continuum of this sort of immobile steady state. Starting from any one of these states, 
we can slightly increase the proportion of educated individuals and reduce the wage differential 
accordingly, and we will have another steady state with no mobility. 
12 Note that upward and downward mobility move together when going from one steady state to another. 
This is because we are changing the nature of the equilibrium, and high-mobility equilibria are more 
efficient in that they are more sensitive to the actual ability of each individual. 
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intervention, it would become self-sustainable. In contrast, the interventions required in 
economies where it is a question of changing the fundamentals, such as Becker and 
Tomes, are generally long-term policy measures.  
 
What would a “one-time” intervention involve? One possibility would be a large-scale 
redistribution of income that could be accomplished either by giving funds directly to 
parents, by giving them “vouchers” for education, or by using income tax revenues to 
subsidize public education – anything that would temporarily break the dependence of 
education on background, thereby increasing the supply of educated workers and moving 
the system toward a low-inequality, high-income steady state.   
 
Other policy recommendations come from “outside” the model. The focus on human 
capital acquisition allows Owen and Weil to consider different policy experiments, all of 
them related to changes in the education system. Given that inefficiencies result from the 
presence of liquidity constraints, a (permanent) program of education loans is the first 
option considered. These authors find that such a program reduces inequality and raises 
average income, effectively moving the economy to a high-education, low-inequality 
steady state. The second policy they analyze is a meritocratic public education system, 
where high-ability individuals get the education that maximizes net output. Again, this 
kind of policy effectively does away with the inefficiencies created by the borrowing 
constraint. Whether this kind of policy is materially feasible in low-income, low-mobility 
countries depends on functional forms adopted in the model.
13
  
 
Why would the implementation of a meritocratic schooling system be an effective 
policy? The answer is that such a system would tend to wipe out the differences in 
schooling that arise solely by virtue of parental income: in other words, for the same 
reason that we argued that an increase in schooling quality would reduce h and therefore 
increase mobility. Note that this is not an abstract consideration. Countries such as China, 
South Korea and Japan have a strong public education sector which uses testing and 
assessments early on as a basis for assigning students to schools and channeling them into 
careers based on their cognitive ability. To a lesser extent, European countries such as 
Germany and France have a strong, high-quality public education sector as well. These 
countries also have greater social mobility than Latin America. 
 
Table 5: Types of Policy Intervention in Owen and Weil’s Model 
Policy 
Type of 
Intervention 
Effect within the Model 
Massive 
Redistribution 
One-Time 
Keeping fundamentals such as education cost 
the same, movement toward a better steady 
state. 
Education Loans Permanent 
Change in fundamentals: slackens liquidity 
constraint. Can potentially improve upon the 
best pre-intervention steady state. 
Meritocratic Public 
Schooling 
Permanent 
Maximizes net output, breaking the link 
between parental income and education. 
                                               
13 It is even more doubtful whether it would be politically feasible, since in a poor country such a measure 
might entail seizing the entire labor income of an adult generation in order to finance education for the 
young.  
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So far, the effects of differences in background are unambiguously inefficient. However, 
this changes when skilled parents transmit advantages because they are, in some sense, 
more efficient than their unskilled counterparts. 
 
Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira: The Roles of Education and Technology 
 
Moving on, Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2003) present a similar setup in which 
workers may be skilled or unskilled and must finance their education without access to a 
loan market. In their setting, however, different agents face different costs of education. 
In order to become skilled, a child needs a certain amount of schooling time, and this is 
affected by two factors: innate ability (which is independent across generations and 
reduces the time needed), and parental background. High-ability individuals need to 
spend less time obtaining formal schooling in order to acquire skills, and the same is true 
for children of skilled parents, who need less outside help in order to achieve the same 
goals, presumably because they have a better understanding of what needs to be done and 
how best to do it. This is an additional, and plausible, pathway through which parental 
background affects children’s well-being.  
 
There are two alternative technologies in this economy: a constant-returns-to-scale 
production sector, where each skilled worker produces output according to her 
productivity, and a sector which uses unskilled workers and natural resources as inputs 
(with such resources being assumed to be equally divided among unskilled workers). The 
difference between skilled and unskilled workers lies in their productivity, a , which can 
take two values, s na a , according to the skill level. 
 
s s
n n
y a
y a x


 (11) 
 
In an equilibrium, skilled workers will earn sa , while unskilled workers will earn 
n n
X
a x a
N

    
 
, where X is the aggregate stock of natural resources and N the aggregate 
supply of unskilled labor. The income of unskilled workers decreases when the aggregate 
supply of unskilled workers rises (since  0,1  ). 
 
Teachers are hired to provide this schooling time (i.e., to “produce education”) and are 
paid the skilled-wage rate. Each skilled worker who is employed as a teacher produces a 
certain amount of units of education: 1h  . This links innate ability and parental 
background to education costs: the less outside time needed for the acquisition of skills, 
the lower the cost of skill acquisition. 
 
The economy consists of overlapping generations of individuals whose lives can be 
divided into two periods. In the first, they acquire skills. In the second, they work, 
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consume, and invest in education for their children. They derive utility from their own 
consumption and from the well-being of their offspring:
14
 
 
 lnpar par offV c E V   (12) 
 
where E is the expectations operator, and V is generational utility. 
 
The process used to model education starts out by specifying innate ability. This is 
indicated by the amount of time that a person would need to be educated in order to 
become skilled, if born to a skilled parent. It is labeled inaptitude and denoted by e (and 
is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1). The educational barrier faced by 
children of unskilled parents is introduced by saying that an individual with inaptitude e 
needs be units of education in order to become skilled if born to an unskilled household, 
with 1b  . Note that when background is introduced in this way, its effect is not 
“inefficient,” since it actually requires more resources to educate children from poor 
families. This differs from the effect of liquidity constraints, which are also present in the 
model and which limit educational investment even if it would be efficient to invest in an 
individual’s education, given her innate ability. 
 
This model has a unique steady state whose equilibrium we will now examine. Under this 
model, parents will choose to invest in their children’s education if: 
 
 
 
 
ln ln
/
/
s n
s
s
y i V y V
e h y if parent is skilled
where i
be h y if parent isunskilled
    

 (13) 
 
Because of the structure of preferences, both kinds of parents will choose to spend a 
maximum fraction of their income in education, which we will call m
15
. This fraction is 
chosen optimally, given the value of education (i.e., the difference in expected welfare 
between skilled and unskilled individuals). 
 
In turn, m defines two threshold inaptitude levels, such that parents will only invest in 
education for lower values of e. These thresholds satisfy: 
 
s
s s s
n n
s n n
s
e
y my e hm
h
be y hm hm
y my e
h y b Ib
  
   
 (14) 
 
                                               
14 It should be noted that they do not care about the amount of resources spent on their children in and of 
itself, but rather about the result of their expenditure. 
15 M is obtained as the solution to    ln 1 s nm V V    . 
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Where I is the measure of income inequality chosen by the authors, given by the ratio 
between the incomes of skilled and unskilled workers: 
 
s
n
y
I
y
  (15) 
 
Note that, given the distributional assumptions of e, these thresholds give the probability 
that the son of a skilled (or unskilled) worker will be skilled and thus serve as indicators 
of mobility. As expected, the probability that the child of an unskilled worker will 
become skilled is lower than it is for the son of a skilled worker. 
 
Now, we want to solve for the gains to education as a function of the fraction of income 
that is spent in equilibrium in order to solve for the optimal m, given the outcomes in the 
labor market: 
 
 n
1
 V ln 1 ln 1sV I h m m
bI
 
          
 
 (16) 
 
What does equation (16) tell us? The gains from education are increasing in inequality. 
This effect is propagated through a direct channel in the form of what could be termed an 
income effect, but it is also generated by the fact that it increases the likelihood that 
children from skilled backgrounds will be more able to afford an education than children 
from unskilled backgrounds. This amplifies the advantage of being born to a skilled 
parent. We can also see that gains from education rise when the share of income that is 
allotted to education increases.  
 
In order to close the model, we need to know the share of individuals who will be 
unskilled in equilibrium, which will in turn determine relative wages. In other words, we 
need to take into account what happens in the labor market. For every ratio of skilled to 
unskilled labor supply, there is a corresponding inequality level, which in turn influences 
the proportion of income that goes into education. In a steady state, this ratio will be such 
that the optimal education demands generated will keep the proportions of skilled and 
unskilled unchanged in the following generation. 
 
Since the model defines a unique steady-state equilibrium, comparative statics come from 
changes in the model parameters. The key finding is that there is no unique correlation 
between inequality and upward mobility (measured by the probability that an individual 
born to an unskilled family will become skilled, ne ). As we have previously shown, this 
level is given by 
 
n
hM I
e
Ib
 , where we have incorporated the fact that the share of 
income going into education is endogenous. 
 
There are two effects.  Through  M I , inequality tends to raise mobility by increasing 
individuals’ incentives for investment in education. However, there is also a negative 
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effect, which is created by the difficulty of paying for a teacher when the wage 
differential is high. This is the distance effect. At low levels of inequality, the incentive 
effect dominates. When inequality is high, the distance effect prevails. 
 
Table 6: Effects of an Increase in Inequality 
 When Initial Inequality is 
 Low High 
Higher Inequality Increases Mobility Reduces Mobility 
 
Of course, inequality is endogenous and depends on the labor market’s structural 
conditions. Hence, Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira first analyze exogenous changes 
in the production sector. Skill-biased technical change raises the wage differential for 
any given workforce skill composition. This kind of change increases the incentive to 
acquire education, thereby raising the proportion of income that goes into education. It 
also increases inequality, and this latter effect acquires greater weight when inequality is 
already high. In other words, skill-biased technical change increases inequality the most 
in economies which were already unequal. The change in mobility mirrors what we said 
above: for low levels of initial inequality, skill-biased technical change increases upward 
mobility; for high levels of inequality, it reduces mobility. 
 
The second set of exogenous changes that these authors analyze relates to the educational 
sector, that is, changes in h and b. An increase in h, i.e., in the overall productivity of 
education, has two general equilibrium effects: it increases upward mobility, and it 
reduces inequality. A reduction in the educational barrier faced by children from 
unskilled backgrounds, as measured by b, has a less clear effect. By making investment 
by unskilled parents more productive, it reduces the fraction of income invested in 
education across the board. This implies greater downward mobility, as children from 
high-skill backgrounds become more likely to forgo an education. However, it can still be 
shown that inequality goes down as mobility goes up. 
Table 7: Effects of Policies in the Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira Model 
Policy/Change Description 
Implemented 
in 
Effect on 
Inequality Mobility 
Increase in sa  
Skilled-biased 
technical change 
Labor market Increase 
Increase 
/ Decrease 
Reduction in h  
Increase in 
productivity of 
educational system 
Education 
sector 
Decrease Increase 
Reduction in b 
Reduction in 
educational barrier 
faced by children 
of unskilled parents 
Decrease Increase 
Public education p 
State financing of p 
units of education 
for every child 
Decrease (for 
most 
parameter 
values) 
Increase 
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The last change that is analyzed is the introduction of public education, which amounts 
to a certain level of education, p, being purchased by the government (financed by taxes) 
and given to all children, with parents being free to supplement that education with 
additional outlays. These authors further assume that there is a proportional tax on 
income, T, and that h equals 1. With these additions to the original model, the education 
thresholds are modified and turn into: 
 
   
1
1 1s n
m
e p m T e p T
b I
 
      
 
 (17) 
 
The main point is that skilled parents make more effective use of public education. 
Carrying out a general equilibrium analysis similar to the one used in the original model, 
including the relationship between taxes and the level of public education, the authors 
conclude that an increase in public education raises upward mobility and, unless both   
and b are too close to 1, reduces inequality. 
 
Summarizing the findings in Table 7, we see that, here again, public interventions that 
operate through the educational sector tend to induce a virtuous cycle of reduced 
inequality and increased mobility. However, it is possible that higher inequality will be 
met by higher mobility, particularly when the factors driving the increases come from the 
labor market and are the result of changes in technology. 
 
Although these three models emphasize different aspects of the determination of income 
inequality and intergenerational mobility, they share a number of common aspects. The 
main intuition is that the more parental background determines individual outcomes, 
the more likely it is that high inequality will be associated with lower mobility. In 
Becker and Tomes (1979), reducing the degree of inheritability lowers inequality and 
raises mobility, which is effectively the same as reducing the educational barriers faced 
by children of unskilled parents in the Hassler, Rodríguez Mora and Zeira (HMZ) (2003) 
model or relaxing the tightness of the borrowing constraint in the Owen and Weil (1998) 
model. In contrast, when we increase incentives to invest in children starting from a 
relatively equal setup, we may find that inequality increases together with mobility. 
This is what happens in the Becker and Tomes model, as well as in the HMZ setup, when 
skill-biased technical change increases the incentive to education. 
 
These models both suggest a natural constraint on how much mobility can be 
changed and point to policies that may affect it. If ability is intrinsically inheritable, as is 
the family endowment in the Becker and Tomes model, then it is a source of permanent 
differences between dynasties and a brake on social mobility. However, this also suggests 
that efforts to “level the playing field” through the use of such measures as compulsory 
and universal public education, tutoring, or early intervention programs may be 
successful in raising income and social mobility. Given the evidence that there is a great 
deal of scope for early interventions to improve cognitive abilities, the assumption that 
ability is by and large independent across generations but that parental background can 
give children an advantage is probably the most relevant for policy purposes. 
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3. INEQUALITY AND MOBILITY: POLITICO-ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
 
So far, we have abstracted from the actual workings of governments. A vast amount of 
literature discusses how politico-economic considerations affect the distribution of 
income, as well as social mobility, when considered intertemporally. We will now 
discuss these kinds of results.  
 
At this point, we are mainly interested in the association between inequality and mobility, 
rather than in the politico-economic consequences of mobility per se (which we deal with 
in a separate section). The main findings discussed in the literature are summarized in 
Benabou (1996). 
 
This author sets up an overlapping generations model in which generations within a 
dynasty are not altruistic toward each other. The utility of each generation is given by: 
 
ln lni i it t tU c d   (18) 
 
where c is consumption when young and d is consumption when old. People are endowed 
with resources w distributed independently and identically across dynasties. These 
resources can be invested in capital and used to generate second-period income, 
according to the technology used: 
 
   
1
i i
t t ty r k w
 
  (19) 
 
where k is the amount of the investment and wt is the average level of resources in the 
community. Given that there are imperfect capital markets, k is limited by individual 
resources – that is, i it tk w . 
 
The linkage between generations comes through this resource level, which can be 
interpreted as the endowment of basic skills: skills possessed by young agents are derived 
from the interaction between parents’ incomes as adults – determined by their own skill 
level – and innate ability, which is independent across generations.  Thus: 
 
1 1
i i i
t t tw y   (20) 
 
There is a political element in the model which comes in the form of income taxation and 
redistribution before individual investment decisions are made. For convenience, the 
author adopts a log-linear specification, whereby post-redistribution income is given by: 
 
   
1
ˆ i i
t t ty y y
 
  (21) 
 
where ty  is determined by budget balance. The tax scheme is progressive when  0,1   
and regressive when 0  . The tax rate results from the workings of the political 
 22 
process. In order to incorporate the possibility of systems or societies with different levels 
of wealth bias, Benabou introduces the variable p, which indicates the position in the 
wealth distribution of the pivotal voter. Higher p implies higher wealth bias. 
 
When a system displays a pro-poor bias, in the sense that the pivotal voter is poorer than 
the mean, the economy converges toward a unique steady state. The stronger the populist 
bias, the higher redistribution and mobility are and the lower after-tax inequality is. Thus, 
we see an inverse relation between inequality and mobility, as greater equality is 
associated with higher mobility, which in this case is induced by political 
considerations. 
 
When a system exhibits a pro-rich bias, however, multiple steady states are possible. 
Equilibria with low redistribution have high (after-tax) inequality and lower mobility. 
They are also less efficient than equilibria with higher redistribution. Thus, we again 
find that inequality and mobility are inversely correlated. Both are jointly determined by 
the nature of the political system, which in turn affects the cross-sectional wealth 
distribution, and by the degree to which it persists from generation to generation. 
 
 
 
4. SOCIAL MOBILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND 
MERITOCRACY 
 
A sizeable portion of the literature on social mobility links it with both equality of 
opportunity and meritocracy, but without – for the most part – specifying the precise 
conceptual link between these notions.
16
 In some cases, these two concepts are taken to 
be almost exact synonyms, while in others they are considered to be related ideas that 
sometimes have a causal link. This ambiguity is attributable partly to a certain disregard 
for semantic discussions by the economic community and partly to the intrinsic difficulty 
of defining “equality of opportunity” and “meritocracy”. In the next sections, we will 
attempt to shed some light on these concepts. 
  
Equal Opportunity and Social Mobility 
 
Numerous authors have given a nuanced treatment to the definition of equality of 
opportunity and its relationship to notions of fairness and justice.
17
 We do not attempt to 
provide a full survey, but rather simply a definition that draws on different sources and is 
intuitively appealing. 
 
                                               
16 In fact, Benabou and Ok (2001b) argue that since equal opportunity is usually seen as the reason why 
mobility is desirable, the degree of mobility in the income process should be ranked according to how 
strongly opportunities are equalized. 
17 See, among others, Rawls (1971), Roemer (1998, 2000), Dworkin (1981) and, more recently, Hansson 
(2004), Sugden (2004) and Hild and Voorhoeve (2004). All of these authors provide numerous additional 
references. 
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As we mentioned in the discussion on mobility, in every society there are certain 
generally desirable social outcomes with regard to income, status, and the like. 
Egalitarian philosophies of justice suggest that some sort of equality should prevail in the 
distribution of these outcomes. Equality in the opportunity to achieve these goals, as 
opposed to equality in the actual distribution of outcomes, seems to reflect the most 
widespread view of what constitutes a fair situation. It is what the “equal playing field” 
metaphor refers to, and it seems to have almost universal appeal.
18
  
 
What exactly, then, is equality of opportunity? Drawing from the common elements in 
Dworkin (1981), Roemer (1998, 2004) and Sen (2000), we can sketch out a very simple 
model that helps illustrate this concept. Say that an individual’s outcomes depend on her 
effort and her circumstances. Effort relates to all actions willfully undertaken by the 
individual that potentially affect her attainment of the desired outcome. Circumstances, 
on the other hand, refer to aspects of the environment that affect the likelihood of 
attaining the goal but that are largely beyond the individual’s power to change. In a 
society which values equality of opportunity, individuals will be held responsible for 
differences in outcomes stemming from differential effort, but not for those that result 
from two agents applying the same effort level starting from different circumstances. 
 
This brief description highlights the common element and the sources of diverging 
opinions among proponents of equality of opportunity. As for the common element, note 
that equality of outcomes per se is not deemed desirable a priori. Instead, differences in 
effort (chosen autonomously by each individual) make differential outcomes not only 
acceptable, but desirable. Differences arise, though, when the time comes to decide what 
constitutes “circumstance” and what constitutes “effort” and, hence, in determining how 
far the equalization of outcomes should go.  
 
One extreme view is to define “equal opportunity” as “non-discrimination”. Under this 
definition, guaranteeing that people are judged by their qualifications only – for instance, 
when applying for a job – is enough to achieve equal opportunity. In this case, the 
relevant circumstances are taken to be “irrelevant” factors that are generally beyond the 
individual’s ability to change: gender, or race, or other such characteristics. If, on the 
other hand, only college-educated individuals are given a chance to compete for a given 
job, this is not considered to be unfair. The implicit assumption is that everyone has had 
the opportunity to acquire the relevant skills and that those who did not do so should be 
accountable for their choice. 
 
The opposite extreme is represented by egalitarians such as, for instance, John Roemer 
(1998), who departs from this view in two significant ways. First, he argues that the set of 
relevant circumstances should include innate ability, family background (in terms of 
connections and of attitudes toward effort, availability of role models, and the like), peer 
group effects, and all factors that affect individual preferences but that come into play 
before an individual can be reasonably expected to  notice their importance. To make the 
                                               
18 This is the theme of the 2005 World Development Report (World Bank, 2005); a large proportion of 
adults in different countries agreed with the statement: “It’s fair if people have more money and wealth, but 
only if there are equal opportunities” (cited in Jencks and Tach, 2005). 
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point explicit, he would argue that whether an individual was raised in an affluent suburb 
where parents expect their children to go to college or whether he was born into a poor 
family where scholastic performance was not deemed important are factors that should be 
regarded as individual circumstances.  
 
The second departure is that he proposes that effort should not be quantified 
independently from circumstances. That is, he argues that the effort expended by an 
individual who completes a two-year post-secondary degree despite having been raised in 
an environment where the median educational level is that of a high school dropout is 
greater than the effort made by a college graduate who comes from a well-to-do setting in 
which the median educational achievement is the completion of a college degree. In 
effect, he suggests circumstances should be used to define groups that serve as a 
benchmark for gauging individual effort. He also calls for a broad definition of what 
factors actually constitute “circumstances”.19 
 
Most opinions lie somewhere in the wide expanse existing between these extremes. Most 
people would accept the proposition that family connections and privileges should not 
matter in determining lifetime income and status. Possibly fewer would agree with the 
idea that differences in innate cognitive or physical ability should play a significant 
role.
20
 It is fair to say that relatively few would want to compensate individuals for 
differences in their preferences that lead them to exert less effort than similar individuals, 
regardless of where those preferences come from.  
 
At this point, we should see a clear difference between meritocracy and equality of 
opportunity as we have defined it here, although we may want to count as “merits” 
aspects that are effectively circumstances. For instance, we may find it plausible that the 
work ethic of immigrant children is not really of their own doing, yet still believe it is 
morally defensible to reward them for their deeds. This underscores the fact that equality 
of opportunity may have the wide support it enjoys partly because of the looseness with 
which the concept is usually employed. 
 
We will now explore the connection between equal opportunity and social mobility. Both 
terms are frequently used interchangeably, yet our previous discussion should have 
established the fact that perfect mobility will only be equivalent to perfect equality of 
opportunity if we adopt an extreme view of what circumstances should be compensated 
for when equalizing opportunity. 
 
By our preferred measures, perfect social mobility implies no correlation between 
parental and offspring outcomes. How could this come about in an actual economic 
                                               
19 Roemer (1998) goes as far as to argue that for the children of Asian immigrants in the US, median 
educational achievement is higher because of their heritage, which encourages them to excel at school; 
thus, they should not enjoy a higher status as adults than children from African-American families who 
were equally poor and unconnected to begin with, but whose environment made it unimportant to go to 
school. 
20 Agreement would probably be greater in the case of people with disabilities. 
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situation? Under perfect social mobility, it should be the case that all differences in status 
that come from being born into a given family are wiped out.  
 
As the models we have described make clear, achieving perfect social mobility means 
that the differences in income-generating assets must be fully compensated for. However, 
these do not just include financial capital and family connections. They also encompass, 
as we have seen, factors such as intelligence, social environment, attitudes about effort 
and the like, which are clearly linked to the attainment of social outcomes and which, to a 
large degree, are inherited through a mix of genetic and cultural transmission 
mechanisms. We discuss this further below, but we would like to point here to the work 
of Bowles and Gintis (2002), who document the extent to which factors other than 
intelligence are transmitted through the family and affect individual earning capacity.
21
  
 
Several models show that the degree of social mobility implied by equality of opportunity 
depends on how we define “circumstances”. Roemer (2004) drives this point home by 
stating that parents influence children’s outcomes through the “provision of social 
connections; formation of beliefs and skills in children through family culture and 
investment; genetic transmission of ability; formation of preferences and aspirations in 
children”.22 He then formally shows that in order to achieve zero intergenerational 
correlation in outcomes, a policy should be devised to equalize all of these sources of 
differential achievement. As is apparent, it is far from obvious that all of these factors 
will be considered as “circumstances” by a majority of the population or by policy-
makers.  
 
This point bears repeating: achieving perfect mobility involves embracing policies that 
attempt to compensate for facts such as parental upbringing, or even innate intelligence. 
In addition, these policies – such as, for example, one geared toward providing more 
educational resources to children with low IQs – must be permanent if they are to have 
lasting results. This combination is quite likely to make them thoroughly unpopular and 
underscores the fact that it may well not be feasible to achieve perfect mobility and that, 
instead, the question should be recast to focus on how far in that direction we may be able 
to go. 
 
A different view of the channel through which equality of opportunity may not imply 
higher mobility appeared in early discussions of the topic, particularly in a paper written 
by John Conlisk (1974) in reply to remarks by Richard Herrnstein, who claimed that 
equalizing opportunity would effectively create castes of individuals ranked by their 
inherited cognitive ability. The model in Conlisk’s paper shows the extent to which this 
is, indeed, true. 
 
                                               
21 Other references are Feldman, Otto and Christiansen (2000) and Korenman and Winship (2000), who 
explore what cultural transmission mechanisms are and how they account for intergenerational correlations 
in several relevant traits. 
22 A variety of models in the economic literature, including all those which we have summarized in this 
article, show that this is indeed the case: that differences in any of these aspects can generate persistent 
inequality across dynasties, even in the presence of complete markets. Piketty (2000) provides a survey. 
The case of beliefs and aspirations is especially interesting and will be examined in detail below. 
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Assume that income obeys a simple system of three linear equations. The income (Y) of a 
given individual depends on realized intelligence (I) and parental income – reflecting the 
return to ability and the degree to which parents transfer income-generating assets to their 
children. Intelligence depends both on the genetic “potential” (G) and on parental 
income, presumably because, as we have already argued in Section 2, parents with higher 
incomes provide a more stimulating environment for their children or may have an 
advantage in education. Lastly, genetic potential is inherited from parents through a first-
order autoregressive process. Of course, there is also an element of “chance” in each of 
these functional dependences (the usual error term). 
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Now, the author argues that fully equalizing opportunity would make some of the 
coefficients in these regressions equal to zero, in particular, 2 and 2 . If this were the 
case – if, say, we could somehow reduce the link between parental income and realized 
intelligence – social mobility would clearly increase in both the short- and the long-run. 
That is, we would see a drop in the intergenerational correlation of income. If we were to 
keep the discussion on this level, we would return to our previous point about the extent 
to which equalizing opportunity would imply setting the coefficients to zero (or reducing 
them to the fullest possible extent). However, the main point in Conlisk’s paper is a 
different one. 
 
Equalization of opportunity, it can be argued, should include reductions in the variability 
of the error term. That is, if the error term captures aspects such as geographical location, 
quality of public education and other environmental variables, an equalization of these 
aspects would strengthen the link between effort and outcomes, thereby making 
individuals with similar characteristics more likely to enjoy similar outcomes. Conlisk 
shows that this reduction would effectively decrease social mobility by making inherited 
traits more determinant.  
 
Note that we are once again reminded of the limits imposed by biological considerations. 
This does not mean that the current situation cannot be improved upon, but it certainly 
should be borne in mind. 
 
Almost any notion of justice calls for individuals to enjoy similar opportunities to achieve 
their goals – for people to interact on a “level playing field”. We have shown the extent to 
which this equality of opportunity would imply social mobility. As we have seen, where 
the equalization of opportunity helps to break down the family transmission of relevant 
traits, it will increase mobility. However, these two concepts are not completely 
equivalent, in that only the advocates of a very extreme position on the issue would 
contend that a satisfactory equalization of opportunity implies perfect intergenerational 
mobility. This extreme position would probably be untenable from a political standpoint 
and would greatly expand the scope of state action. 
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Meritocracy and Social Mobility 
 
A concept related to equal opportunity is that of “meritocracy”. Again, as commonly used 
by economists, meritocracies are assumed to go hand in hand with social mobility. In this 
section, we provide a brief conceptualization of the term and discuss its relation to 
mobility and equal opportunity.
23
 
 
As a very first approximation, the idea of a meritocracy describes a society where income 
and social status reward “merit”; that is, they accrue to those who “deserve” it. As Sen 
(2000) puts it, however, this leaves the concept essentially underdefined, for the 
definition of what constitutes merit is contingent on the definition of what a good society 
is and of what helps to bring it about. 
 
What is merit, then? Meritorious actions are presumably those that have desirable 
consequences, possibly from an ex-ante point of view, and are therefore to be 
encouraged. A well-planned investment designed to generate a positive impact may, of 
course fail, as it inevitably entails a degree of risk –as any other investment-, but it would 
presumably be regarded as having more merit than one with a negative expected value. In 
this sense, a meritocratic society should tend to encourage wise investments. Work effort 
in productive activities is another example of an action that would be rewarded under this 
concept. 
 
This line of thought would seem to be in step with what most people consider fair. 
“Good”, productive actions should be rewarded, and meritocracy is a reasonable goal for 
society.  Note that if we think that some level of equality is a desirable end, then a 
meritocratic society should also reward actions that tend to reduce inequality (including, 
potentially, affirmative action, education programs, and the like). 
 
However, the customary approach taken to this subject in economics does not follow this 
path but instead sees “merit” as being an intrinsic characteristic of an individual. What is 
arguably the initial characterization of this idea, by sociologist Michael Young in his 
book The Rise of Meritocracy, 1870 – 2033, defines merit as the combination of ability 
and effort. Although the initial definition of merit can be expanded to accommodate some 
measure of effort, since it probably leads to better outcomes, the element of ability is a 
different proposition. Once ability is taken into consideration, then the task of tracing the 
relationships among meritocracy, social mobility and equal opportunity requires us to 
specify how ability comes to be and how it is transmitted across generations.
24,25
 
                                               
23 Much of the discussion in this section is based on the collected papers presented by Arrow, Bowles and 
Durlauf (2000). 
24 Ability should be broadly defined as anything that is rewarded in the labor market. It is generally taken, 
though, to be roughly equivalent to cognitive ability or IQ.  
25 In an article published shortly before his death, Michael Young states: 
“Ability of a conventional kind, which used to be distributed between the classes more or less at 
random, has become much more highly concentrated by the engine of education. 
(…) 
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This idea of meritocracy could, however, fail to induce social mobility in the long run for 
two linked but distinct reasons.  
 
On the one hand, we may think, as Herrnstein and Murray do in The Bell Curve, that 
intelligence is for the most part genetically inherited. If this were indeed the case, then, as 
we have argued in the previous section, a meritocracy would typically be associated with 
low mobility. People with high cognitive ability have a high return to education, which 
makes them acquire skills and enjoy high wages. In turn, their offspring will also have 
high wages because of their high cognitive ability. This would put mobility at odds with 
the idea of meritocracy. In a way, it also goes against equal opportunity, insofar ability is 
part of an individual’s circumstance.  
 
However, there are strong reasons to believe that there is still a great deal of work left to 
do before differences in cognitive ability can be claimed to be solely determined by 
genetic endowments. Most of the work on intelligence is based on IQ measurements. 
Flynn (2000) and Feldman et al. (2000) argue that, while there is a high correlation of IQ 
scores between generations of the same family, it is quite probable that a large share of 
this correlation is due to environmental factors (in other words, that it is a result of 
“cultural” transmission). This is also supported by research on early child development, 
which suggests that the human brain is quite malleable during the early years.
26
 If this is 
the case, it may be possible to devise policies that increase the reward both to merit and 
to social mobility. If people are put on roughly equivalent “cognitive starting points” by 
means of, for example, targeted early intervention programs, then educational attainment 
– and eventually labor-market outcomes – would mostly depend on effort and career 
choices. Since this reflects mainly individual preferences, we could expect mobility (in 
the sense of relative, or exchange, mobility) to increase. We will further explore this line 
of reasoning in Section 6 based on the survey conducted by Cunha, Heckman, Lochner 
and Masterov (2005). 
 
The second reason why meritocracy could lead to reduced social mobility is to be found 
in the arguments put forward by Bowles and Gintis (2002), who contend that much of the 
intergenerational transmission of status is not explained either by genetic transmission of 
IQ or by the transmission of assets. Instead, they reason that personality traits such as 
fatalism, a work ethic and respect for authority are both important in the determination of 
                                                                                                                                            
With an amazing battery of certificates and degrees at its disposal, education has put its seal of 
approval on a minority, and its seal of disapproval on the many who fail to shine from the time 
they are relegated to the bottom streams at the age of seven or before.  
(…) 
I expected that the poor and the disadvantaged would be done down, and in fact they have been. If 
branded at school they are more vulnerable for later unemployment.  
They can easily become demoralized by being looked down on so woundingly by people who 
have done well for themselves.  
 
It is hard indeed in a society that makes so much of merit to be judged as having none. No 
underclass has ever been left as morally naked as that.” 
26 For research on this topic, see Young (2002). 
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labor-market outcomes and transmitted from generation to generation, presumably 
through parental role models, peer effects, and other cultural mechanisms.
27
 These 
channels are much more difficult to neutralize, as they involve a change in the 
transmission of values. Unless these channels are modified, it is very unlikely that 
increased rewards to merit will raise long-run social mobility. Quite to the contrary, they 
may lead to the outcome dreaded by Michael Young (1958): a system of merit-based 
castes. This might be considered desirable on moral grounds, but it runs counter to the 
attainment of a society with high mobility. It could also be inefficient from a purely 
economic standpoint, as we will argue in Section 6. 
 
To conclude this somewhat normative discussion, we find that a transition to a society 
where merit determines social rewards would not necessarily increase social mobility, 
unless we accept the proposition that all the determinants of merit – including preferences 
and possibly aspirations – are independent of parental origin. This echoes our previous 
section on equal opportunity, with the cautionary note that the link between social 
mobility and meritocracy, which is usually assumed away in most economic work on 
mobility, is actually dependent on a series of assumptions about the inheritability of 
income-generating traits. 
 
In other words, while we may think that both meritocracy and mobility in a given society 
are desirable, it may well be the case that policies that advance one of these causes work 
against policies designed to attain the other. As an example, opponents of affirmative 
action as a means of redressing past injustices usually claim that it runs counter to the 
establishment of a meritocracy, yet affirmative action may serve to increase mobility.  
 
 
5. MERITOCRACY, OPPORTUNITY, MOBILITY AND EFFICIENCY 
 
As a means of transitioning to our discussion of mobility and its economic consequences 
and correlates, we survey a set of models that point to its interrelationship within an 
economic context, as well as its efficiency consequences, while keeping the normative 
concern present. 
 
The Size of the Pie 
 
Benabou (2000) provides a general framework for an explicit examination of the links 
among these four notions. In a model very similar to those we have discussed, he starts 
by assuming that individual pre-tax income reflects both social background and personal 
characteristics. As a first approximation, these personal characteristics are assumed to be 
distributed independently from social background and to represent “ability”. At this 
point, he equates equality of opportunity with meritocracy (under the common heading 
“meritocracy in opportunities”) and identifies it with the share of total income variance 
that comes from variability in individual traits. 
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Granting that the assumption of independence between individual traits and social 
background is not quite realistic, he redefines meritocracy in opportunities as the share 
of total variance in pre-tax income that is “unexpected” given social background. That is, 
he measures how much of current income is not dependent on parental status and the like, 
but instead on other autonomous factors. Insofar as these factors reflect variability in 
personal choice, effort, and so forth, this definition arguably comes closer to an actual 
meritocracy than the first one. 
 
A related idea in this context is that, in a meritocracy, individual outcomes should also 
differ – in the sense that after-tax incomes should not be completely equalized. In other 
words, the existence of a meritocracy should imply some sort of incentive system 
whereby good actions get higher rewards. Thus, it should also be the case that “luck” or 
talent is effectively rewarded even after taking into account any fiscal redistribution – 
what Benabou terms “inequality of outcomes”. 
 
Table 8: Aspects of Meritocracy 
Societal Outcome Definition Environment 
Meritocracy in  
opportunities 
Degree to which market 
outcomes are unrelated to 
social background, explained 
by personal choices or 
characteristics 
Market, 
pre-tax 
Inequality of 
outcomes 
Degree to which effective 
income is determined by 
individual talent and abilities 
After-tax 
 
Both of these societal attributes are desirable, but they are not logically connected; it is 
quite possible that a society may be very meritocratic in its market opportunities, but that 
it fully redistributes income, so that effective outcomes are equalized. At the same time, 
whether inequality of outcomes is desirable clearly depends on whether opportunities 
have been allocated fairly. This consideration leads to the formulation of a two-
dimensional measure of meritocracy – a “meritocracy utility function” – which expresses 
an ordering of all possible combinations of equal opportunity and unequal outcomes.
28
 
This makes the relationship between these two notions explicit. In particular, this 
measurement should reflect the fact that, as opportunities become more equal, inequality 
in outcomes is more acceptable (even desirable) and that as outcome inequality rises, the 
value of additional equality of opportunity increases. 
 
What about the rewards to effort? In an argument that echoes Roemer (1998), Benabou 
claims that differences in the level of effort “must ultimately reflect different (perceived) 
returns to effort, hence differences in either background or ability”. Thus, the degree to 
which increased rewards to effort lead to improvements in terms of an overall 
                                               
28 As a technical note, the function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, with a positive cross-
derivative, and quasi-concave. The value of the function is minimal when either dimension tends to zero:  
an aristocracy, if there is no meritocracy in opportunity, or a mediocracy if all post-tax incomes are 
perfectly equalized. 
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meritocracy would depend on the extent to which attitudes toward effort are shaped by 
family background. If the influence of this factor is high, then equality of opportunity will 
be reduced (although an increase in rewards to effort will certainly raise the inequality of 
outcomes). 
 
Table 9: Effect of Rewards to Effort in terms of Meritocracy 
Outcome Effect 
Meritocracy in 
Opportunities 
Depends on factors affecting costs and 
returns to effort: if these factors depend on 
parental characteristics, an increase in 
rewards to effort would reduce the 
meritocracy of opportunity 
Inequality of Outcomes 
As long as there are any differences in 
effort level, inequality of outcomes will 
increase with rewards to effort 
 
When considering policies from an intertemporal, long-run point of view, it becomes 
apparent that tradeoffs are inevitable; most policies will affect both dimensions in 
different directions. Consider a policy that redistributes income: it reduces inequality of 
outcomes, but it increases equality of opportunity in the following generation, as 
deviations from mean market income are less likely to come from differences in parental 
background. To understand these effects more fully, the author presents a model of 
infinitely-lived dynasties. 
 
Each generation is born with a certain level of human capital, which depends both on 
random luck (independent across generations) and on the individuals’ parents, through 
their realized level of human capital and through an educational choice as well. That is, 
we assume that skills are hereditary to some level, but that they are also affected by 
education. Each generation must choose three quantities: labor supply (which is costly in 
terms of utility but increases pre-tax income), own consumption,
29
 and education for the 
next generation. There are no capital markets, so education and consumption must be 
financed by current income. Current income depends on the level of the labor supply and 
on human capital. Income is taxed and redistributed, which means that taxes can relax the 
liquidity constraint for families with small human-capital endowments. 
 
Because of these credit-market imperfections, income inequality is associated with lower 
output growth. However, starting from a given level of inequality, the tax rate that 
maximizes current growth is lower than the rate that maximizes the long-run level of 
income.
30
 Intuitively, we know that redistributing today reduces the current incentive to 
work but also induces growth further in the future, since it reduces inequality in all 
subsequent periods by shifting income to liquidity-constrained households.  
 
                                               
29 An overlapping generational interpretation would include “children’s” consumption. 
30 Throughout the discussion, it is assumed that the tax rate is the same in every period. 
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How do equality of opportunities and inequality of outcomes appear in this model? The 
former is a measure of social mobility, and it decreases when the relative importance of 
education and parental human capital in the determination of current human capital are 
high, as well as with the importance of skills in the labor market. It increases, on the other 
hand, with the level of redistribution. Inequality of outcomes, by contrast, increases with 
the importance of skills and decreases with redistribution. 
 
Table 10: Impact of Parameters in terms of Meritocracy 
Parameter 
Effect of an Increase in the 
Parameter 
Impact of education on current 
human capital 
Reduces meritocracy in 
opportunities in the presence of 
liquidity constraints 
Impact of parental human capital 
on current human capital 
Reduces meritocracy in 
opportunities 
Market return to acquired skills  
Reduces meritocracy in 
opportunities 
Increases inequality of outcomes 
Extent of redistribution 
Increases meritocracy in 
opportunities 
Reduces inequality of outcomes 
 
What is their impact on growth and long-run output? On the one hand, inequality of 
outcomes increases incentives to work, thereby raising overall efficiency. Equality of 
opportunity is also efficient, as it tends to reduce the growth losses that operate through 
income inequality, i.e. through differential access to education. However, the extent to 
which this aspect of meritocracy goes hand in hand with efficiency is limited, as reducing 
disparities in access to education also decreases the efficiency gains to be derived from a 
level of education that is more productive for the offspring of highly skilled individuals.  
 
In summary, meritocracy and efficiency are closely related when capital markets are 
imperfect, but their correlation depends on how parental background affects the 
productivity of investments that raise income.
31
 In addition, meritocracy has two distinct 
aspects, equality of opportunity and inequality of outcomes, and a normative ordering 
should incorporate both dimensions. By and large, social mobility, equality of 
opportunity and meritocracy in general tend to increase efficiency in economies with 
limited access to education finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
31 This suggests the possibility that breaking the link between parental background and the productivity of 
education enhances efficiency and mobility. Cunha et al. (2005) argue that this is what early childhood 
interventions do.  
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Inequality of Opportunity and the Need to Provide Incentives 
 
A related approach is developed in Phelan (2006). He argues that in a dynamic 
contracting model with unobservable effort where agents demand incentives not to shirk, 
it is efficient to have both unequal opportunity and social mobility. In other words, agents 
born into families with high realized output should enjoy higher income (unequal 
opportunity) but, over time, all dynasties should have a positive probability of changing 
positions in the income ranking (social mobility). 
 
In this model, there is a continuum of dynasties, each composed of a generation that lives 
for one period. Production depends on effort: if a household exerts effort  0 , , Na a a , 
then output  0 , , Nq q q occurs with a probability  | 0p q a  . Intuitively, low 
outcomes are more likely when effort is low, while high outcomes are more likely when 
effort is high. Households receive an “allocation” of effort (i.e., they are told what effort 
level to exert), but this effort level is not observable. In other words, households can 
claim to exert a certain level of effort, but may actually shirk instead. 
 
Household utility in one period is given by: 
 
where c is consumption in one period and U is increasing in consumption and strictly 
decreasing in effort. A household cares about the expected value of the average 
discounted payoffs,    
0
1 ,t t tt U c a 


  . 
 
As we have said, this is a dynamic contracting model. A planner designing this dynamic 
social contract must choose the best among all feasible allocations. What are 
“allocations” in this context? Formally, allocations specify an initial distribution of 
promises of lifetime utilities, 0 , a sequence of effort allocations for each level of 
promised expected utility,   
0t t t
a w


, a sequence of consumption allocations for each 
level of observed output and promised expected utility,   
0
,t t t t
c w q


, and a sequence of 
“promises” or “continuation values” for every realization of output and initial promise, 
  1 0,t t t tw q w

 
. In other words, it starts by specifying how “rich” (in terms of utility) a 
family can expect to be over its members’ lifetimes and then provides a rule specifying 
how much effort a generation must exert.  Next, for each possible realization of outcome, 
it states how much will be consumed at that time and how much will be “inherited” by 
the generations to follow in the form of “promised” utility. 
 
 
 
 
 
     ,t t t tU c a u c v a   (23) 
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For an allocation to be feasible, it must:  
 
- Deliver on its promises: The expected utility arising from following the allocation 
starting at time t with a promised utility wt must equal wt, so that the outcome does 
not depend on people being systematically wrong about their prospects.
32
 
- Provide the right incentives: If an allocation calls for a certain level of effort, that 
effort should be optimal for the household in expected terms, so that its members 
will freely choose it from among all possible alternatives.
33
 
- Respect the resource constraint: The amounts consumed in each realization of 
aggregate output must not exceed that output.
34
 
 
There are many different allocations that satisfy these three conditions, which means we 
must have some criterion we can use to choose among them. Phelan first recasts the 
problem as one of several individuals who are linked to each other by some sort of 
altruism.  Their individual welfare therefore depends both on the existing level of utility 
when they are alive and on the promised utility to their descendants. In other words: 
 
           1| 1 , , ,
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
q
w P q a w U c w q a w w w q        (24) 
 
This is a reinterpretation of the previous model, with identical formal results. The 
advantage of thinking through the problem in this way is that it suggests a criterion which 
can be used to rank feasible allocations. The author argues that the correct welfare 
criterion is the average welfare of all generations, across both time and dynasties. This 
departs from the traditional criterion, which maximizes a weighted average of 
   
0
1 ,t t tt U c a 


  , the “per generation” utility of a dynasty at time zero, where the 
average is over dynasties. The argument backing up this change is that the traditional 
formulation, which has appeared in several previous papers, puts no weight on the 
welfare of subsequent generations.
35
 
 
The author shows that the optimal allocation under this criterion exhibits both unequal 
opportunities and social mobility.  
                                               
32 Formally,              1| 1 , ,
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
q
w P q a w u c w q v a w w w q 

      . 
33 Formally,            1ˆ ˆ| 1 , ,
t
t t t t t t t t
q
w P q a u c w q v a w w q 

      . 
34 Formally,        0 | ,
t
t t t t t t t t
V
q
P q a w c w q q d w    where     0 |V u c v a c C   and 
C is the consumption set. 
35 Formally, a planner must choose a dynamic allocation that maximizes 
0
0
1
liminf
1
T
T t
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T




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V
v w d w  . 
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Unequal opportunities are reflected in the fact that dynastic utility during every period 
tends toward a limiting yet variable distribution (at every point in time, some people will 
be born with lower expected welfare than others). These disadvantaged individuals will 
be those born into dynasties with low realized output in the past. This is a consequence of 
the need to provide incentives for agents to expend effort. In other words, since incentive 
constraints are binding, a way to relax them – i.e. to provide incentives in a more efficient 
way – is to make the utility of generations down the line (which current generations care 
about, as they are altruistic) dependent on current output. In other words, it pays to have 
parents who are able to provide lifetime advantages to their children. 
 
Social mobility is associated with the fact that an individual is born with a given expected 
dynastic utility does not preclude him from moving up or down in this distribution as 
periods go by. In fact, this is bound to happen. In particular, there are no castes (i.e., 
income groups whose composition does not change over time). This effectively means 
that, eventually, all dynasties will have a chance of changing their ranking, no matter 
where their starting point is.  
 
What is remarkable about this result is how it relates to the veil of ignorance under which 
allocations are to be judged, according to philosophers whose postulates can be traced 
back to John Rawls. This is an optimal allocation in the sense that it would be chosen by 
an individual who does not know which dynasty or generation she will be born into. Even 
so, and despite the fact that all agents are ex-ante equal, the optimal arrangement exhibits 
inequality of opportunity. In addition, it features social mobility as a characteristic of an 
optimal arrangement, thereby pointing to its efficiency. 
 
This result treats all agents as perfectly identical in terms of the income opportunities 
they face, at least in the initial period. This should be borne in mind, since no information 
is provided as to what should be done if these opportunities were to differ by dynasty. 
 
Intelligence, Mobility and Efficiency 
 
So far, all the models we have discussed relate to earnings mobility for workers. A 
different case in which meritocracy may relate to higher efficiency and mobility is 
modeled by Hassler and Mora (2000), who consider the social mechanisms that allocate 
agents to occupational  categories: entrepreneurs vs. workers. They define “intelligence” 
as “what you use when you don’t know what to do”, borrowing from Jean Piaget, and 
explore the link between intelligence and entrepreneurship in high- and low-growth 
environments. 
 
In their model, individuals are born with a given level of intelligence, which is less than 
perfectly correlated with their parents’, and with a stock of social assets that is fully 
determined by their background. They interpret meritocracy as the degree to which social 
positions are influenced by innate intelligence as opposed to background (note how this 
relates closely to the “equality of opportunity” aspect of meritocracy defined by Benabou, 
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2000). In this model, a higher degree of meritocracy implies higher mobility, since innate 
traits are less correlated across generations than social background is. 
 
Individuals, then, must choose whether to become entrepreneurs or workers. The latter 
earn a fixed economy-wide competitive wage, wt, which is fully known at the time of the 
decision, whereas entrepreneurial income depends on the ability to forecast the value of a 
random variable, interpreted as the “correct” decision.36 Entrepreneurs hire a certain 
number of workers, lt, and choose a as close as possible to a stochastic process xt. Profits 
are given by: 
 
   
2
1/ 22t t
x a r
t t te e l w l
 
    (25) 
 
For any rational choice of l, profits are maximized by correctly predicting x. Individuals 
have a certain belief as to the true value of xt, which they assume to be normally 
distributed with mean  j  and variance  1/ P j . 
 
The authors show that regardless of their beliefs, all entrepreneurs will demand 
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workers. The best action a, on the other hand, will depend on those beliefs and, 
in this case, will be  a j . Given this, the expected utility37 of agent j if she becomes 
an entrepreneur depends crucially on the precision of her belief and equals:
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If the agent chooses to become a worker instead, utility is no longer stochastic.  Instead, it 
is fully known before the decision and equals ln tw . Note that this implies that expected 
profits must be higher than wages, and we can therefore think of entrepreneurs as “rich”.  
 
Agents choose the occupation that offers a higher expected utility, which is determined 
by a threshold degree of accuracy in their beliefs about the true state of the world.  
Agents with a high degree of accuracy end up being entrepreneurs, while agents with a 
lower level of accuracy choose to become workers. In other words, an agent will choose 
to be an entrepreneur if: 
 
                                               
36 This decision changes from period to period; in the real world, it would be a multidimensional object 
indicating the “best way” to run a firm. 
37 We are assuming a log utility function. 
38 “Precision” is defined as the inverse of the variance of a random variable. 
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(27) 
 
This shows that the process that determines such beliefs will be the driving force behind 
the “class structure” in this model. Entrepreneurial activities will be the domain of people 
with access to high-quality information. Workers will be those with higher variance in 
their beliefs about the way the world functions. 
 
Technology is a pair  , rr x  that follows an exogenous stochastic process in continuous 
time (specifically, a Brownian motion). For the initial analysis, technological growth is 
exogenous and follows: 
 
0
g
r g rx x dz     (28) 
 
where dz is a standard Wiener increment. In particular, by setting the exogenous rate of 
technological growth between periods to g, we obtain: 
 
1t t tx x g    (29) 
  
with t  a standard normal, independent over time. Note that g  can be interpreted as the 
amount of information needed to keep up with the new technology and suggests that, at 
times of high rates of technological growth, the “best way” to run a firm may vary widely 
from one period to the next. We can now turn to the key issue: how beliefs about x are 
formed. 
 
Each individual has two sources of private information, neither of which he can trade or 
transfer.  
 
First, he obtains an unbiased signal about 1tx   from his parents. Depending on social 
background, the signal will vary and will be more or less precise: children of 
entrepreneurs will get to know the exact value of 1tx  , whereas children of worker 
families will have an unbiased signal of 1tx   with identical variance 0  .  
 
A second source is the individual’s cognitive ability, or intelligence.39 Each individual is 
born with an unbiased signal of x. Individuals differ in the precision of their signal, which 
                                               
39 We omit the lengthy discussion presented in the original paper about what the politically (and 
biologically) correct term is for the ability to make good decisions in uncertain environments with less than 
perfect information.  
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may take on one of two values, the higher of which corresponds to highly intelligent 
individuals. Specifically, the precision for low-intelligence individuals is 1, while for 
high-intelligence individuals it is 1  . Intelligence is independent across individuals 
and along generations. Individuals are rational Bayesian agents, and they update their 
prior signal based on both sources. The resulting precision levels are: 
 
Table 11 
  Family Background 
  Entrepreneur Worker 
Intelligence 
High 
1
g


  
1
g

 


 
Low 
1
1
g
  
1
1
g 


 
 
There are two sources of increased precision. Knowledge of the past realization is useful 
in constructing a forecast. Individuals from all groups use this knowledge, but those from 
working-class backgrounds start off with worse information. This is captured in Table 11 
by the fact that 
1 1
g g  


. Both groups have to deal with the fact that the accuracy of 
this forecast will depend on how fast the environment is changing. A second source of 
increased precision is individual intelligence.  
 
Our interest in this “precision” stems from its role in determining the class structure. We 
should keep in mind that, in an equilibrium, there should always be both entrepreneurs 
and workers. This means that agents with the lowest signals (in this case, low-intelligence 
individuals from working-class backgrounds) will be workers. By the same token, high-
intelligence individuals from entrepreneurial families have the best information and thus 
will be entrepreneurs. The threshold level will be somewhere in between, and the 
ordering between high-intelligence working-class individuals and low-intelligence 
entrepreneurial-class persons depends on the model’s parameters. 
 
For meaningful possibilities of social mobility and meritocracy, therefore, the key 
inequality is whether a highly intelligent agent from a working-class background will 
have higher precision (and, thus, a higher probability of choosing to be an entrepreneur) 
than a low-intelligence individual from an entrepreneurial family.  For high enough 
values of g , which measures the pace of change in the economic environment, this will 
indeed be the case, as the value of past information becomes negligible in comparison to 
understanding current conditions. 
 
In fact, when these authors study the steady state of this model,
40
 they find that the 
parameters that explain whether there is intergenerational mobility depend on g  and on 
the distribution of intelligence (specifically on the proportion of highly intelligent 
individuals that are born in each generation, q).  
                                               
40 In the steady state, the proportion of entrepreneurs and workers is kept constant. 
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Table 12: Factors affecting Social Mobility 
Model 
Parameter 
Interpretation 
Effects on Social 
Mobility 
Pathway 
g  
Pace of change in 
the economic 
environment, 
complexity 
Higher g  leads 
to higher mobility 
Intelligence becomes more 
decisive in the occupational 
decision. When 
1 1
1
g g

  
  

, smart 
children from working-class 
families become entrepreneurs, 
“replacing” low-intelligence 
children from entrepreneurial 
families. 
q 
Proportion of 
highly intelligent 
individuals in the 
population 
In high- 
complexity 
environments, a 
very large or very 
small q leads to 
lower mobility 
When q is too large, not all 
intelligent individuals can be 
entrepreneurs in an equilibrium. 
Thus, some of the intelligent 
persons from working-class 
households  will remain workers. 
When q is too small, some of the 
less intelligent agents from 
entrepreneurial families will 
become entrepreneurs. 
Thus, extreme levels of q induce 
a high degree of dependence for 
individual outcomes on initial 
family conditions. 
 
 
When the environment is not very complex ( g  is low), there can be no social mobility 
in a steady state. Why? For a society to be in a steady state, the proportion of 
entrepreneurs must remain the same. Yet, in order for there to be some degree of social 
mobility, some children from working-class families must become entrepreneurs. As we 
have argued, these children must be those with high intelligence. 
 
In low-complexity environments 
1 1
1
g g

  
  

, if high-intelligence individuals 
from working-class families choose to become entrepreneurs (a necessary condition for 
mobility), so will low-intelligence individuals from entrepreneurial families. But if this 
were the case, then the share of entrepreneurs would increase (it would include all former 
entrepreneurs, plus at least some of the highly intelligent individuals from working-class 
families), thus creating a situation that departs from a steady state. Consequently, any 
steady state in a low-complexity society will involve social immobility. 
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What happens in high-complexity environments? This depends on q. In general, in these 
environments it is relatively hard to be a successful entrepreneur, and inherited 
information has little value. This leads intelligent individuals to choose to become 
entrepreneurs. Will the set of highly intelligent individuals coincide with the set of 
entrepreneurs? This would indicate both mobility and meritocracy, but the answer 
depends on the parameters. For instance, q could be so large that if all highly intelligent 
individuals were to become entrepreneurs, their income relative to wages would be too 
low, and some might choose to be workers instead (and the ones who would make that 
choice would be from working-class families). Alternatively, q could be low, making 
wages too low and inducing (some of) the low-intelligence agents from entrepreneurial 
families to become entrepreneurs themselves.  
 
Therefore, in highly complex societies, there will always be a greater degree of 
meritocracy, in the sense that entrepreneurs will be more intelligent than the 
population as a whole. However, the degree of mobility will depend on the proportion of 
intelligent individuals. A large proportion of intelligent individuals reduces downward 
mobility, thus increasing the extent of dependence between past and current outcomes.  
 
These authors add one last twist: technological growth may be partly related to 
investments undertaken by entrepreneurs. In this case, individuals who choose to be 
entrepreneurs can also choose whether to innovate; in other words, they choose their own 
level of g. Higher levels of g increase both the mean and the variance of expected profits 
and are best used by intelligent individuals. The authors show that the level of innovation 
will not depend on social background, but rather on intelligence alone. As before, 
whenever a low-intelligence individual chooses to become an entrepreneur, so will a 
high-intelligence agent from the same background. Also, whenever an individual from a 
working-class background finds it profitable to become an entrepreneur, so will an 
individual from an entrepreneurial background. 
 
The end result is that, in this case, there will in general be two steady states. In one of 
them, there is no mobility and little innovation, since innovation is driven by intelligent 
individuals only. In the other, intelligent individuals from both classes become 
entrepreneurs in any generation, and so technology (and, therefore, output) grows, thus 
increasing the degree of meritocracy and making mobility possible. 
 
The policy implications of this model are not absolutely clear. We may think that, starting 
from a rigid society, opening up to competition and technological adoption will tend to 
reduce the “informational advantages” that are inherited by children of entrepreneurial 
families. This model abstracts from failures in the credit market, so there is no role for 
policies in tackling this issue. However, if it were a case of potential entrepreneurs from 
working-class families facing some sort of credit constraint, there could be room for 
incentives for research and innovation  that would more than likely be used by intelligent, 
as opposed to well-off, individuals. 
 
Finally, a note of caution is warranted regarding these policy prescriptions, which amount 
to making the economic climate more “challenging” –for instance, by opening up to 
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international trade and foreign technological progress– so that “inherited” knowledge is 
not useful in determining outcomes. This, however, may make for a tough transition, as 
entrepreneurs make initially bad decisions that drive down real wages for the economy as 
a whole.  
 
It is not clear how to fit education into the model. One interesting way in which it might 
work with the model would be if it increases the precision of the private, innate signal of 
each individual. In other words, if it increases intelligence. There does not seem to be any 
sort of consensus on this point, however, particularly since there is little evidence that 
education, other than at a very early age, actually changes cognitive ability. Also, if this 
were the channel through which education acted, it would likely do relatively little to 
reduce the barrier between the rich and the poor; consequently, starting from a situation 
with no mobility, it would not erase the advantage of a low-intelligence individual from 
an entrepreneurial family, as he would now also be more intelligent.  
 
However, it may be that education acts through another channel.  It might provide more 
information about past environments, therefore directly reducing the advantage enjoyed 
by children in entrepreneurial families. This second role could potentially move a society 
away from a steady state of perfect immobility by providing intelligent agents from 
working-class families with an extra edge. 
 
Thus, in short, although we may think equality of opportunity or meritocracy are 
desirable attributes in a society, they bear no necessary connection to economic 
efficiency. In many cases, they are positively related, but in these cases the mechanism 
seems to go from economic efficiency to opportunity or meritocracy and mobility. This is 
particularly true when economies have imperfect market arrangements that create room 
for efficiency-enhancing policies – namely, when imperfect capital markets preclude 
individuals from fully realizing their potential human capital and skills. 
 
 
6. EFFECTS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY 
 
We will now elaborate upon our line of reasoning in arguing that mobility may be a 
necessary feature of an efficient economic system. As we have suggested, it is hard to 
argue, from a purely economic point of view, that mobility should be a goal in and of 
itself, as opposed to being the consequence of efficiency-enhancing policies involving 
human capital accumulation. However, when we add a political dimension to the 
analysis, we find that mobility may have consequences per se, as it adds an extra 
dimension to distributional conflict. Lastly, we will see that the relevant effect does not 
derive from the actual income process, but rather stems from the perception that agents 
have of it, which informs their position in the political arena. 
 
 
 
 
 
 42 
Economic Efficiency 
 
At this point, we have briefly gone through most of the main body of the economic 
literature relating to social mobility and economic performance. We will now summarize 
the key findings, without going into the specific details of each particular model. 
 
The main conclusion, as set forth in Becker and Tomes (1979), Owen and Weil (1998), 
and Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2002), is that whenever liquidity constraints 
prevent individuals from acquiring an efficient level of human capital, social mobility is 
limited and economic efficiency is reduced. In such cases, redistribution helps ease the 
liquidity constraint and increases long-term mobility. 
 
When markets are complete, however, social mobility may be low (equivalently, the 
effects of different initial conditions may be persistent), but efficiency considerations do 
not justify interventions – only equity concerns provide a reason to redistribute. A 
number of these models can be found in Piketty (2000). He identifies two main reasons 
for “persistent inequality” with complete markets.  
 
The first is the intergenerational transmission of financial assets in a model where income 
is determined by labor supply and returns on wealth:  
 
it t it t ity v a r w   (30) 
 
where a is ability that is rewarded in the labor market at rate v, and rw  is capital income 
– r is the interest rate and w the stock of inherited wealth. Without any behavioral 
assumption, income inequality will be greater than the inequality of labor earnings, unless 
a (which is taken to be exogenous) and w are negatively correlated. This is a feature 
observed in empirical studies.  
 
If we assume further that bequeathed wealth is an increasing function of income, then one 
can see that income disparities are persistent even if labor income is fully equalized (with 
a set at 1 for everyone). This is indeed what motivates our study of mobility. The further 
insight, which is also borne out by available empirical evidence, is that when assets can 
be bequeathed, income is likely to be more closely correlated intergenerationally than 
labor earnings. 
 
, 1 1 ( )i t t t ity v r S y    (31) 
 
As Piketty illustrates, initial differences in asset holdings will only be equalized in the 
long run if savings are a concave fraction of income, labor earnings are the same for 
every individual, and fertility behavior is the same for every family. A departure from 
any of these assumptions (by positing that families endogenously determine their 
bequests, for instance, or that there is a degree of heterogeneity in family size which 
affects the potential for leaving bequests) leads to persistent wealth inequalities in the 
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long run. In the case of differential fertility behavior, for example if dynasty i has  1 in  
children, then the transition for individual wealth is: 
 
   
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Consequently, different dynasties may end up having different steady states of wealth. 
This will be the case if poor families tend to have more children. 
 
Piketty argues that, within this framework, inheritance taxation is the most effective 
policy instrument. Of course, in any but the simplest model, such taxation would have to 
be a permanent feature of the economy.
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 The distortionary consequences of this type of 
taxation clearly depend on the driving forces behind inheritance. If bequests are mainly 
accidental by-products of precautionary saving, then taxing them has no obvious cost. 
However, if they are the product of intergenerational altruism, the distortionary effect is 
more likely to be negative. The strength of this conclusion, however, depends on 
particular assumptions as to the precise reason why bequests are left. It makes a 
difference, for instance, whether it is bequests per se that affect parental utility, or 
whether there is a “dynastic utility function” that each generation maximizes. In fact, 
inheritance taxation can potentially increase long-run wealth disparities. These results 
lead Piketty to quote Mulligan (1997): “much more research (…) [is] necessary to arrive 
at a strong conclusion regarding the unimportance of taxes for intergenerational 
mobility”. 
 
A second (efficient) reason for persistent inequality is family inheritance of ability and 
tastes. Piketty uses a very simple reduced-form model, similar to the one employed by 
Becker and Tomes (1979), and stresses the fact that intergenerational transmission of 
ability works at least as much through family environment and learning as it does through 
genetic transmission. As we have repeatedly argued, this intergenerational transmission 
reduces mobility. Piketty considers the question of what sort of policies could break 
down this transmission.  He concludes that if capital markets are indeed perfect and this 
persistence of ability is therefore efficient, then any public intervention would compound 
the problem, as it would make high-ability families even better off by covering part of the 
cost of human-capital acquisition, while overall levels would not be changed. Again, 
even if one were to argue that redistribution in this context is desirable on purely ethical 
grounds (based on an appeal for equality of opportunity, for instance), the consequences 
of a redistributive policy are far from obvious, since we do not know much about the 
magnitude of the incentive effects of earnings taxes.  
 
A similar concern is raised by persistence in social outcomes that is explained by 
differences in tastes, given the fact that individuals measure themselves against reference 
groups and low-income individuals have low-income reference groups. In this and other 
                                               
41 For a non-permanent tax rate, we would need a situation where a one-time equalizing tax leaves the 
economy in a steady state. But, of course, this means that equal wealth was a steady state to begin with, and 
this is true only in models with few sources of heterogeneity in economic behavior. 
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similar models, where individuals are somehow responsible for their own misfortune, it is 
quite hard to come up with acceptable policy interventions. In a sense, it implies that 
perfect social mobility is not efficient. 
 
A related connection between efficiency and mobility is given when parental background 
acts as an input in the production of human capital and the acquisition of skills. That is, 
higher-income families make better use of the resources at their disposal to educate their 
children. This is a feature of Hassler, Rodríguez Mora and Zeira (2003), Raut (1996), and 
Benabou (2000). The relevant tradeoff is then between the fact that educating the children 
of the rich is relatively cheaper and the potential output that is lost because high-ability 
children born into poor families do not receive an education that fully develops their 
ability. This is true under imperfect capital markets, but also under no liquidity 
constraints: if ability is correlated across generations, then reducing the educational 
advantage of high-income families helps make low-income/high-ability dynasties into 
high-income/high-ability families. This tradeoff is at the heart of Benabou’s argument. 
 
Hassler and Mora (2000) make a related point, noting that the advantage enjoyed by rich 
entrepreneurial parents is fully inefficient, in that society would be better off in the long 
run if these advantages were not strong determinants of economic position. However, it 
remains true, even in this model, that the children of parents with a strong informational 
advantage will be entrepreneurs. The downside is that this kind of informational 
advantage is most likely to be relevant in situations marked by low growth and low levels 
of long-run output. 
 
Overall, then, efficiency does not seem to be determined by mobility – rather, it seems to 
be a jointly determined result. The relation is at its strongest when there are liquidity 
constraints that prevent agents from making efficient investments in their stock of human 
capital. However, there are constraints on what level of social mobility is efficient, as, 
even in contexts of perfect availability of financing opportunities, there would be some 
intergenerational persistence, and in many cases the appeal to policies that increase social 
mobility stems from the belief that it is in itself a desirable feature of the income process. 
 
Political Outcomes 
 
So far, we have taken an approach in which redistribution is analyzed insofar as it relates 
to efficiency, without focusing on the degree to which it is more or less likely that 
redistribution will come about. This aspect is the main contribution of the models we will 
analyze in this section. 
 
The first finding, which has been widely cited, points to a direct connection between 
income mobility and redistribution when individuals care about their own interests only. 
This is the formalization by Benabou and Ok (2001a) of the “Prospect of Upward 
Mobility” (POUM) hypothesis. This is a customary answer to the question as to why low-
income voters may oppose substantial redistribution and is based on the idea that they 
may “take into account the fact that they, or their children, may move up in the income 
 45 
distribution and therefore be hurt by such policies”. Three assumptions underlie this 
hypothesis: 
 
- Policies are persistent, so that what is decided today is expected to remain in place 
for a number of periods. 
- Agents are not too risk-averse, since otherwise they would favor the income-
smoothing possibilities provided by redistribution. 
- Individual families who are currently poorer than average (and therefore would be 
among the beneficiaries of redistribution) expect to become richer than average. 
 
The usual assumption has been that this last condition cannot exist in situations where 
agents have rational expectations. This paper shows that this is not the case. 
 
The setting is one where income is strictly exogenous and follows some given stochastic 
process. Agents are allowed to vote on a flat, proportional tax rate, the proceeds of which 
accrue to each citizen in equal proportion. In a static setting, we obtain the traditional 
median-voter result, where, if the voter with the median income is poorer than the mean, 
her preferred tax rate will be the policy outcome of electoral competition between two 
parties. In this context, where taxation has no deadweight loss, the preferred tax “rate” is 
actually complete expropriation. 
 
This result breaks down when a temporal dimension is given to the problem. The 
simplest way to see the underlying mechanism is to analyze what happens when income 
is deterministic. The transition function  1t ty f y   specifies how (pre-tax) income 
changes from one period to the next. Transition functions are assumed to be increasing. 
 
The first case to be analyzed focuses on a two-period scenario where individuals vote at 
date 0 on a tax scheme to be implemented at date 1. If we call tF  the cumulative income 
distribution at date t and t  the average income at date t, an individual with time-zero 
income y will prefer a laissez-faire approach (a zero tax-rate, 0r ) to full redistribution ( 1r ) 
if her date-1 income will be higher than the date-1 average. 
 
  0 1dFf y f    (33) 
 
From Jensen’s inequality, if f is strictly concave, the agent with a mean income in period 
0 will oppose redistribution. 
 
   0 0 0 1dF dFf f y f      (34) 
 
At the same time, the individual with the lowest initial income will surely favor 
redistribution. This underlies the result that there is a critical income level below the 
average income such that individuals with higher income oppose redistribution and those 
with lower income favor redistribution. The main result, though, is that, for any income 
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distribution F0, a laissez-faire policy will be preferred by the median voter under some 
concave transition function f*. In fact, this will be the case for all functions that are more 
concave than f*
42
. 
 
A second step, which highlights the role of persistence in government policies, assumes 
that agents choose at time 0 a tax scheme that will be in place during periods 0 through T. 
Agents care about their present discounted income stream. Given a transition function f 
and initial income y, an individual will prefer a laissez-faire policy if: 
 
 
0 0
T T
t t t
t
t t
f y  
 
   (35) 
 
where tf  is the result of applying  f , t successive times. The results are similar. In the 
first place, there is, as before, an income level y* such that people with higher incomes 
will favor a laissez-faire approach and those with lower incomes will want redistribution. 
This support for a laissez-faire policy changes depending on two features of the model: 
the transition function, and the time horizon of the policy change (which includes the 
number of time periods and the discount factor). Indeed, longer temporal horizons and 
higher discount factors promote support for a laissez-faire response. Once again, this 
effect operates through the convexity of transition functions:  as the time horizon grows, 
transition functions are composed, generating 1 2, ,..., Tf f f , and these functions are 
increasingly concave. 
  
These observations carry over to the case where income is stochastic. In this case, the 
analog of the concavity of the transition function is the existence of a stochastic process 
for individual income which is concave in expectation. That is, the expected value of 
income tomorrow, given today’s income, is a concave function of the latter. In this case, 
again, for every distribution we can find a stochastic income process such that the median 
voter opposes redistribution. This case of the POUM hypothesis posits agents with 
completely rational expectations and is consistent with very unequal realized income 
distributions in each period.  
 
Although there is no model of the underlying income-generating process, this result 
captures one of the essential consequences of social mobility in the political arena. Social 
mobility can be seen as implying concave transition functions (this idea is explored in 
Benabou and Ok, 2001b). It reduces political conflict between the pivotal voter and the 
rich, thereby reducing equilibrium redistribution.
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42 f  is “more concave” than g if it is obtained from g by applying an increasing, strictly concave 
transformation. 
43 In a related result, Harms and Zink (2003) develop a model where this result (the median voter preferring 
no redistribution) follows from an explicit economic choice problem, where individuals vote on a tax on 
their earnings and choose their skill level. If the median voter can finance his education and there is a skill 
premium, he may expect to lose from redistribution when he enters the labor market. In that case, the 
prospect of increasing the distance between the median voter and the poor – even if there is no real 
exchange mobility – reduces his support for redistribution. 
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As we have already mentioned, Benabou (1996) summarizes several models in which 
political variables affect mobility. Basically, in the presence of imperfect capital markets, 
redistribution is economically desirable. Whether it can be expected to be the outcome of 
the political process, however, depends on what group in society has the most political 
weight. That is, he allows for a departure from the one person = one vote paradigm. This 
departure is summarized by the distance, in terms of wealth, between the median agent 
(who we would expect to be pivotal in a traditional setting) and the pivotal voter (whose 
preferences are represented by the political system). 
 
Benabou finds that if political power is held disproportionately by a wealthy minority, 
then redistribution is inefficiently low (in the sense that increasing redistribution 
unambiguously increases efficiency), as is mobility in the asset distribution. Moreover, 
there are multiple steady states, with intertemporal efficiency being lower in less 
redistributive, more inegalitarian steady states with lower mobility. On the other hand, if 
the political system has some degree of pro-poor bias, there will be only one steady state, 
with high redistribution. 
 
The main idea is, therefore, that the degree of distributional conflict in a society affects 
its equilibrium level of redistribution. Increasing social mobility reduces this conflict and 
thus curbs the demand for redistribution. In contexts where redistribution is inefficient, 
this would be a desirable result. In environments where redistribution is efficient, 
however, it is often the case that mobility is not exogenous to the political outcome, but 
rather is endogenously determined within the model. In this case, it is far from obvious 
that reducing redistribution is in any way desirable. 
 
 
7. THE PERCEPTION OF MOBILITY 
 
In the models we discuss in this section, individual income depends on parental 
background, effort, and luck. With no market imperfections, redistributive schemes based 
on income taxes are inefficient, as they distort the labor/leisure choice. Individuals’ 
beliefs about the income process affect their preferences regarding the amount of 
redistribution. At the same time, the existence of a redistributive scheme changes 
individual incentives to exert effort. Low transfers provide an incentive for work, which 
in turn lowers the impact of luck. High transfers, in contrast, lower the incentive to exert 
effort, with the consequence that luck plays a more important role in individual 
outcomes. As a consequence, individual beliefs are self-fulfilling.  
 
We first draw attention to the model developed by Piketty (1995). His intention is to 
understand why it is that, although by and large poor people support redistribution more 
than the rich do, family background affects these preferences. Indeed, most of the 
available data indicate that poor people who have experienced downward mobility (that 
is, their parents were relatively rich) oppose redistribution more than the average poor 
individual does, whereas high-income people from a poor background tend to support 
redistribution more than the average rich person does. The point of the paper is to show 
how this can be brought about, not by a difference in redistributive aims (all agents will 
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have the same goals), but rather by differences in income trajectories which inform 
agents’ beliefs about the world. 
 
There is a continuum of dynasties. At each point in time there is one generation that votes 
on taxes for the following period, works, and pays the taxes specified by the preceding 
generation. There are two possible pre-tax income levels: 
1 0,y y (with 1 0y y ), which are 
randomly assigned in the population, with a probability distribution that depends on two 
factors: family background (children of parents who obtained a high income in the 
previous period have a higher probability of having a high income than do children of 
poor parents), and effort, where all individuals share the same cost of effort, C.  
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There are two relevant parameters in this model: the advantage derived from being born 
in a rich family, 1 0  , and the degree to which effort affects the probability distribution 
over outcomes,  . These are unknown to the agents in the model. 
 
Agents vote for their preferred tax rate after they choose their effort level and after their 
income is realized. Voters can be divided into four groups based on their background and 
current situation:  
 
Table 13: Voting Groups 
  Parents’ Income 
  0y  1y  
Agent’s Income 
0y  Stable Low Income Downward Mobile 
1y  Upward Mobile Stable High Income 
 
The tax redistribution scheme operates by taking income from those with high 
realizations and making transfers to those with low realizations. All agents share the same 
objective function: they would like to minimize the effective disadvantage suffered by 
children from poor families – that is, they want to maximize their expected welfare.  
 
Agents choose their effort levels, and this choice is distorted by setting a high tax rate. In 
fact: 
 
    1 1 1 0, 1t te a y y        (37) 
 
Taking this into account, the optimal tax rate for an individual is:  
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      21 1 0 1 1 0 1 0, /t tH a y y            (38) 
 
where H is the proportion of individuals who receive 
1y . 
 
The tradeoff which agents face when choosing their preferred tax rate is that high taxes 
discourage effort and lower total output. If all agents shared the same beliefs, however, 
all would choose the same rate:  if they believe income differences are mainly driven by 
background, they will favor high redistribution; if, on the other hand, they believe effort 
is the main driving force, they will oppose redistribution due to its incentive costs, since 
it will affect equilibrium effort and thus the long-term equilibrium income distribution for 
children from poor families. This is what is spelled out in equation (38). 
 
Note that the only source of disagreement in this economy is about the fundamentals of 
the model: there is no conflict of interest in the strict sense of the word. How, then, are 
beliefs about the true state of the world formed? Piketty explores the implications of 
purely individual rational learning – that is, starting from a given prior and observing the 
experience of their parents, agents update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule. In turn, these 
posterior beliefs guide their choice of action.
44
  
 
The crux of the argument has to do with the fact that the restrictions placed by Bayes’ 
rule on individual learning are very lax. Starting from a prior, Bayesian updating will put 
more weight on posterior beliefs which are consistent with actual experience.  In other 
words, if an individual experiences high mobility, posterior beliefs will be such that 
upward mobility, given the agents’ choices and priors, is most likely. However, there is 
no necessary link between this and the actual parameters of the model; interpretations 
will vary depending on beliefs, as we show in Table 14.  
 
Table 14: Interpretation of Upwardly Mobile Trajectory 
Prior Beliefs Action Taken Bayesian Update 
High 1 0  , Low   Low Effort 
Large role of 
chance 
Low 1 0  , High   High Effort Large role of effort 
 
Piketty shows that there is a continuum of possible dynastic types in a steady state.  The 
two ends of this spectrum correspond, on the one hand, to those who believe effort is 
more important and who therefore oppose redistribution, exert a high level of effort and 
have high average incomes (the “right-wing” dynasties) and, on the other,  those who 
believe luck plays a more central role and who therefore support redistribution, exert a 
                                               
44 The optimal actions depend both on individual beliefs about the true model and on beliefs about what 
other people believe, since this will inform each individual’s response to tax rates. Piketty shows that, at the 
extremes, where people assume that everybody else shares their beliefs, or where they know the exact 
distribution of beliefs, the preferred tax rate still increases as an individual’s belief in the importance of 
luck rises, and decreases as individual’s belief in the significance of effort increases, which is what Piketty 
needs to arrive at the main result. 
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low level of effort and have low average incomes (the “left-wing” dynasties). A one-time 
experience of downward mobility despite a high level of effort, or of upward mobility 
despite a low level of effort, will not fully counterbalance these long-run dynastic beliefs, 
since every agent is aware of the “sampling effects” (i.e., of the fact that there is, after all, 
some degree of random luck). 
 
In this model, therefore, conflicting views about social mobility and the incentive effects 
of redistribution are perfectly compatible with the absence of any deep conflict in terms 
of beliefs about what a fair social outcome is. It shows how history and personal mobility 
experience can lead to divergent views about the world and, in particular, how all the 
views can be consistent with one “true” state of the world.45 When agents do not have an 
incentive to engage in widespread experimentation, this outcome is indeed likely. A 
second result is that there is no necessary relation between the optimal level of 
redistribution for the true parameter and the level which obtains in the long-run 
equilibrium. This model therefore underscores how fragile normative recommendations 
are and thus, how sensitive they are to the introduction of reasonable forms of uncertainty 
about the true model. 
 
A related sort of connection between beliefs and mobility is introduced in the work of 
Benabou and Tirole (2006). They start from the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the extent 
to which people believe luck is an important determinant of individual outcomes is highly 
correlated with their preferred redistribution levels. These authors subsequently present a 
model with two equilibria: one in which people believe the world is fair and that effort is 
consequently an important determinant of success in life, and they therefore oppose high 
levels of redistribution; and one in which people believe the world is mostly unfair and 
hence support redistribution and exert low levels of effort. This is compatible with the 
actual world being either “fair” or “unfair”; thus, in one of the equilibria, people are 
consistently wrong. 
 
This model starts from a setup that is very similar to the one found in Piketty (1995). The 
main difference lies in the condition that the first generation – in a two-period game –  
chooses an optimal belief, given the beliefs of others and the redistribution level that will 
follow in equilibrium. A second departure is that tax rates are voted upon selfishly.  
 
The setup is the following. There is a continuum of agents, indexed by i. As in Piketty 
(1995), income is the result of an interaction among innate advantages, effort, and luck.  
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As before, e is effort and i  reflects parental background: i  takes on a high value for a 
fraction 1/ 2  , and a low value for the rest.  
                                               
45 These are empirically important, as is demonstrated by the evidence presented in Graham and Pettinato 
(2002) and in Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) and by the references in Piketty (1995).  
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At date zero, parents receive a signal which noisily informs them about the true value of 
 . They subsequently choose what to tell their children (or themselves, in a different 
interpretation). Once they or their children have the revised signal (which they know to 
be potentially distorted), at time 1, they vote on the tax rate that would maximize their 
own welfare and choose their optimal effort level (in the intergenerational interpretation, 
this is done by their descendents). Lastly, their income is realized in the following period, 
and redistribution and consumption take place.  
 
An individual’s preferred tax rate has three components: 
- The larger the innate differences in income prospects are ( i  , the difference 
with respect to the average), the higher the rate is. 
- There is a POUM effect: Optimistic individuals who expect a higher return to 
effort also expect to move up the income distribution, and this lowers their 
preferred tax rate. 
- If individual effort is distorted downward because of the lag between effort and 
consumption, the optimal tax will be lower for individuals who see this policy 
channel as a way of correcting that distortion. 
 
The authors show that two distinct equilibria arise. In one, a large proportion of the 
population chooses to believe that the world is fair. Therefore, these people vote for a low 
tax rate.  This justifies their belief that effort pays, since, in equilibrium, low-income 
individuals are more than proportionately likely to have exerted a low level of effort. In 
the other, a majority chooses to believe that the world is intrinsically unfair and votes for 
a high degree of redistribution. This reduces individual incentives to exert effort, with the 
result that, in equilibrium, people with high pre-tax incomes are disproportionately from 
high-income backgrounds. Note that both equilibria are possible regardless of the true 
state of the world. The story told in the paper is that of a true world in which effort does 
not pay, but in which people may choose to believe it does because they need to “believe 
in a just world”. 
 
A similar multiple-equilibria model with differences in beliefs that lead to differences in 
preferences over redistribution is that of Alesina and Angeletos (2005). In their case, 
however, these are truly rational expectation equilibria, with self-fulfilling beliefs.  
 
Agents live for two periods and engage in a productive activity in each of them. Taxes 
are set at some point in the middle of an agent’s life, which is parameterized in the 
model. Pre-tax income is determined by individual ability (A), investment during the first 
period of life (k), and effort in the second period (e), as well as by a certain amount of 
“noise” ( ). Both ability and noise are random and i.i.d. across agents.  reflects the 
point in life when taxes are set (it reflects what investments are sunk when the tax rate is 
decided). 
 
 1i i i i iy A k e         (40) 
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The government imposes a flat tax rate on income and shares the proceeds equally among 
all agents.  
 
People have an intrinsic demand for social justice and fairness (they would like to reduce 
the impact of sheer luck in individual income) but at the same time would like to reward 
individual effort and talent.
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 Accordingly, they consider a fair income to be: 
 
 ˆ 1i i i iy A k e       (41) 
 
Thus, there is a level of “socially fair” income for given characteristics of individuals, 
namely, that which an individual would obtain with no taxes and no noise. Overall social 
fairness is given by the extent to which after-tax incomes differ from this ideal. Social 
injustice is a weighted average of the “variance decomposition” of income inequality. 
 
     2 2ˆ ˆ1i i iVar y Var y y       (42) 
 
If income were exogenous, and minimizing   were the only goal, then the preferred 
level of redistribution would be: 
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Which is decreasing in the “signal-to-noise” ratio: the higher the variability in the noise 
component, the more desirable redistribution would be.  
 
However, this ratio is endogenous in equilibrium, since equilibrium effort depends on the 
expected tax rate. A high expected tax rate reduces the incentive to engage in productive 
effort, thereby increasing the importance of noise in realized income and thus providing a 
rationale for voting for high levels of redistribution. The opposite holds true for a low 
expected tax rate. The consequence is that both kinds of equilibrium are possible and 
compatible with rational expectations. Thus, concerns for fairness are compatible with 
both high and low levels of redistribution in equilibrium. 
 
In all three papers, we see that beliefs about the true nature of the income process may 
drive economically powerful forces regardless of whether they are correct (and, in a 
sense, with multiple rational-expectations equilibria, there is no “outside world” that is 
independent from beliefs). This relates to the POUM hypothesis, in that it may well be 
that beliefs about the existence of social mobility – or equality of opportunity, as in the 
papers that we have mentioned – drive demands for redistribution. As we will discuss in 
the following section on the empirical evidence, the studies conducted thus far indicate 
that this is indeed the case. 
 
                                               
46 Note the relation with the concepts of meritocracy and of equalization of opportunities by reducing 
variability in outcomes as outlined by Conlisk (1974). 
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8. CONCLUSIONS: A roundup of policy implications  
 
In this discussion we explored a series of definitions of social mobility and settled on one 
according to which situations with high mobility are considered to be those where the 
relative economic status of an agent is not dependent on starting conditions such as 
family background or connections. 
 
As is detailed in Table 15, most of the models we have studied suggest there is room for 
addressing social immobility through some sort of education policy. A question remains, 
though: What are the limits on education’s impact? In other words: How far can we 
possibly go in the direction of social mobility? 
 
Table 15 adds a policy intervention that, while related to education, is not explicitly 
addressed by the models we have surveyed but that is implied by their treatment of 
“ability” and its intergenerational transmission: early childhood interventions. This is 
motivated by a strand of research that departs from the unidimensional conception of 
“ability” embraced by most economists and scrutinizes the process of skill formation. We 
provide an overview, based on the survey by Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov 
(CHLM) (2005). 
 
This section suggests that a combination of different policies has the potential to improve 
social mobility in the short and long terms. 
 
In the short run, policy should deal with the fact that some degree of immobility is 
unavoidable, given the long-lasting consequences of poor parental environments. 
However, efforts should be made to ensure that individuals from poor households who 
have managed to acquire skills have the opportunity to develop them further. The steps to 
be taken in this direction should include the creation of mechanisms for financing higher 
education and discouraging discrimination and nepotism in labor markets, possibly by 
increasing market competition and transparency in State hiring. 
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Table 15: Policy Implications 
Policy Effect Model 
Possible 
Limitations 
Public School 
System 
Reduces the need for 
educational finance. 
Makes education more 
uniform. 
C74 
HMZ03 
OW98 
Takes ability (and 
its transmission) as 
given 
Early Childhood 
Intervention 
Reduces intergenerational 
transmission of skills, or 
parental advantage in 
education, by directly 
addressing the mechanisms of 
ability formation. 
B00 
BT79 
C74 
CHLM05 
HMZ03 
Political feasibility 
Education Loans 
Provides financing to those 
who would profit from 
education but face liquidity 
constraints. 
B00 
HMZ03 
OW98 
Takes ability (and 
its transmission) as 
given 
Inheritance Tax 
Reduces income inequality and 
immobility that stems from 
financial bequests. 
BT79 
P95 
Endogeneity of 
bequests and other 
investments in 
children limits the 
feasibility of full 
equalization 
Promotion of 
Competitive 
Markets 
Reduces the impact of 
noncognitive parental 
advantages (race, connections) 
by making actual productivity 
matter in hiring decisions. 
Makes entrepreneurial 
activities more complex and 
dynamic. 
BT79 
C74 
HM00 
Political feasibility 
Transition 
 
B00: Benabou, 2000 
BT79: Becker and Tomes, 1979  
C74: Conlisk, 1974 
 
CHLM05: Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and 
Masterov, 2005  
HM00: Hassler and Mora, 2000 
HMZ03: Hassler, Rodríguez Mora and Zeira, 
2003 
OW98: Owen and Weil, 1998 
P95: Piketty, 1995 
 
 
 
For long-run results, however, the most promising policies appear to be early intervention 
programs, which can break down the dependence between the development of socially 
productive skills and parental background. These initiatives hold out the promise of 
greatly improving both social mobility and economic efficiency at one and the same time. 
Efforts should be made to design interventions which take into account local conditions, 
along with carefully designed evaluations, so that lessons can be learned in terms of how 
such initiatives are operated, how they can be improved, and how they can be extended 
into large-scale programs. 
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